City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2-2021

Legal Purgatory: Why Some Animals are Neither Persons nor
Property
Sharisse Kanet
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4114
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

LEGAL PURGATORY: WHY SOME ANIMALS ARE NEITHER PERSONS NOR PROPERTY
by
Sharisse Kanet

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2021

©2020
SHARISSE KANET
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

Legal Purgatory:
Why Some Animals are Neither Persons nor Property
by
Sharisse Kanet

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
09/06/2019

Steven Ross
Chair of Examining Committee

09/06/2019

Nickolas Pappas
Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee:
Steven Ross
Jesse Prinz
Peter Godfrey-Smith
Lori Gruen

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
iii

ABSTRACT

Legal Purgatory:
Why Some Animals are Neither Persons nor Property
by
Sharisse Kanet

Advisor: Steven Ross

All animals with non-borderline sentience are deserving of certain legal considerations
independent of their use and relationship to human beings. That is, all sentient beings
should have some rights. Given the current organization of the U.S. legal system, which
divides all entities into property or persons, it is not surprising that animals are relegated
to property status. I put forth a proposal to fix this whose central suggestion is that we
create a third legal designation, legal patient, into which all non-person sentient animals
(those which do not properly belong on either current category) would fit. These animals
would receive certain limited rights, which would be implemented through legal
structures already in place, such as those used in providing legal advocacy for children.
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Chapter 1: Background and the Current State of Affairs

I. Introduction
There is a growing agreement today that animals need more robust legal
protection than they currently have. The past two centuries have seen both
increased industrialization of animal use and exploitation and a slowly expanding
popular concern for animal welfare. With the advent of factory farms, animal testing
regulations for new products, exponential increases in the destruction of animal
habitats, and so on, the situation for many animals, both domestic and wild, has
been getting consistently worse, as they have been forced to pay the costs of the
advancements of our modern society. The atrocities that animals under human care
are currently subjected to are various and ubiquitous, from factory farms, to
experimentation, to circuses, and so on. (For a review, see Beauchamp 2008.) Some
of these uses of animals will be addressed in later chapters in so far as they provide
examples of what changes may be necessitated by my proposal. Interestingly, the
same abuses which have hurt so many have also brought issues of animal welfare to
the forefront in a way they may have not been otherwise.
Animal welfare legislation has been expanding in places like Norway,
Germany, and Switzerland, to name just a few.1 Often times, these expansions
recognize that animals have value beyond their mere instrumental value in their
many present-day uses. For instance, Norway’s Animal Welfare Act states “Animals

This project is a work about US law; however, I will reference other countries from time to
time when comparison seems useful.
1

1

have an intrinsic value which is irrespective of the usable value they may have for
man. Animals shall be treated well and be protected from danger of unnecessary
stress and strains.” (2011) In this country, some states have been making advances,
for example California’s recent ban on battery cages, (The Times Editorial Board
2014) and the public appears to have begun a slow awakening to the horrors of
animal cruelty inflicted on the millions and billions of mammals and birds we use
for research, food, etc.
This progress is heartening, and it is also insufficient. Even in countries like
Norway, the ethics of animal treatment is phrased in terms of welfare, that is, in
terms of improving the conditions of animals that we use, without a consideration of
the underlying assumption that we may use them at all. Welfarists, such as Robert
Garner, generally tend to focus on how we may use nonhuman animals without
questioning whether we can use them. Another side of the debate is comprised of a
varied group of people we may call animal rights activists, including Steven Wise
and Gary Francione, who believe that certain animals should possess rights. What
criteria make this determination, and therefore which animals get included, varies
by thinker. The suggestion of giving animals rights is often accompanied by the
claim that these animals should be made legal persons. Such animal rights activists
are usually extraordinarily critical of animal welfare projects as perpetuating a
broken system. As Tom Regan has said, “To reform injustice is to prolong injustice.”
(Regan 2011, par. 3) Giving certain animals rights is a way to identify them as beings
who are more than instrumentally valuable, and deserve consideration because of
who they are, not how we feel about them. Other legal, philosophical, and political
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theorists have offered suggestions, but these are either problematic for their own
reasons or do not offer much by way of practical solutions.
This gap can be better understood when we consider our insufficiently
nuanced legal system. Our legal system acknowledges only two sorts of being:
persons and property. The former are beings with rights and the latter are not.
Currently all animals are legal property. Many thinkers have aimed to work on
improving animals’ conditions within the confines of the property designation,
trying to improve living conditions, slaughter methods, and so on. Others have
argued for giving some animals the person designation. This would involve the
abolition of certain animal-based practices in totem.
My project aims to address this space from several angles. First, I will argue
that there are fundamental flaws on both sides of this welfare/rights debate. In
some ways, I think that even animal rights proponents are asking too little. In
focusing on personhood for a small group of animals, as many of them do, they are
leaving out many other creatures that require our moral attention. Animal welfarists
are also asking too little in that they seem to ignore the important normative
difference between being protected as property and having rights. Other proposals,
such as Kagan’s, do nothing to address the legal questions at all.
As I see it, these issues and others are all symptoms of a larger problem— the
acceptance of a legal system with just the categories of persons and property. In
such a system we are required to put animals (as a whole, by species, or by
individual) into one of these two buckets. I will argue that the majority of animals
used in the U.S. today for food, experimentation, etc. do not belong in either. In
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particular, I will argue that all (non-borderline) sentient animals deserve more
consideration than toasters (i.e. inanimate property), but not all sentient animals
deserve the same consideration as humans (i.e. legal persons). Many definitions of
person revolve around complex cognitive abilities such as self-awareness, which do
not delineate a sensible moral threshold. Therefore, what our legal system needs is
for a third category of being to be recognized: the sentient nonperson. I call these
beings legal patients, and argue that they deserve to be accorded certain minimal
rights, including the right to bring a civil suit and receive damages.
I think that creating a third category will resolve many problems. First and
foremost, it will avoid the false dichotomy that the person/property divide
perpetuates. Persons are not the only type of being deserving of rights. This is
especially true since the concept of personhood has been expanded to include nonliving beings such as corporations and ships. By creating a third category, we also
avoid the psychological resistance many humans may experience by belonging to
the same legal category, person, as other animals, and therefore avoid much of the
associated pushback.
One obvious question regarding this project is whether it is practically
feasible. I think it is, and will discuss the practical implications in some detail. If we
look to our current legal system, there is already a framework in place to
acknowledge and enforce the rights of incompetent humans (children, the mentally
incompetent, etc.) whom we believe to be persons and to have the associated rights,
but who cannot themselves implement those rights. This involves, among other
things, assigning a representative to speak on behalf of said persons in legal
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contexts. I see no reason why we could not expand the application of this framework
to legal patients. I will explore legal documents, laws, and specific court cases in
order to make the argument that such a change is realistic.

II. Animal Treatment in Farms, Labs, and Zoos
Animals are used in a great variety of industrial and social contexts. They are
used as food, subjects of experimentation, as entertainment, companions, workers,
and much more. Given the pervasive presence of such animals under human care
and control, it seems natural that we should offer them fairly robust protection. As
we will see shortly, there is some indication that lawmakers agree. From anecdotal
evidence, such as a dog owner’s sensitivity to her pet’s emotional states, to videos
that animals activist groups like PETA have put out, to growing scientific evidence
such as recent pain studies, there is a widespread awareness that many animals can
suffer and are suffering (I will define “pain” and “suffering” more formally in the
next chapter). While it may turn out that some animals cannot suffer, it is extremely
rare in this day and age for a scholar of any merit to claim that no nonhuman
animals can suffer, or that their suffering has no moral import.2 Further, many
animals may be capable of suffering, not just on a physical level, but on an emotional
level as well. For instance, many species can feel such things as boredom, jealousy,
anger, etc. that are not necessarily caused by physical damage. I will review some of
this literature in Chapter Two. But let us assume that many animals suffer. Given
this, it is not surprising that we should care about such suffering. And it is clear that
There are exceptions of course. The theologian William Lane Craig holds a version of this
view wherein only higher primates and humans can really suffer. (Craig 2009)
2
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there is a great deal of it to care about.3 I will not, and cannot, give a detailed account
of current animal uses and conditions here. But I will supply a brief account of some
of the more common circumstances in which domesticated animals find themselves.
Those familiar with this topic may wish to skip to the next section.
Many animals live their entire lives on factory farms. At least 35 million cattle
are killed each year in the U.S. for food alone, along with 110 million pigs, almost 9
billion chickens, and hundreds of millions of other animals. (USDA 2011) Their
living standards are by and large quite low (although there are occasional
exceptions). Some of the circumstances they experience include overcrowded cages,
bodily mutilation without painkillers, forced and constant pregnancy, separation of
parents from their young, poor nutrition, large doses of antibiotics, living in unclean
conditions including cages lined with their own excrement, living with dead and
rotting conspecifics, infections, illnesses, and injuries resulting from their poor
housing conditions, high levels of stress, cages too small to turn around in, inability
to perform species typical behaviors, an almost complete lack of veterinary care,
and so on. Not all factory-farmed animals experience all of the things on this list, but
the majority experience most.
While their lives can be painful, it is during transportation and slaughtering
that some of the most objectionable practices occur. During transport, the animals
Despite my use of the word “care” here, a full discussion of care ethics would blur the focus
of the current section. Instead, I’ll say a few words here. Nel Nodding (1984) makes the
distinction between caring for and caring about, where the former refers to actions that
provide actual services and the latter refers to caring ideas or intentions. Without using
precisely that language, Chapter Two (on sentiocentrism) will deal mostly with the question
of whom we should care about and why, and Chapter Five (laying out my proposal) will deal
mostly with the question of how we could legally care for those we’ve agreed to care about.
3
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are forcibly crowded into trucks (the method by which this is done varies by
animal) to the extent that they often are forced to stand due to lack of space. They
can be legally kept in this space for up to 28, or in some cases 36, hours (The 28Hour Law4) without receiving food or water. These spaces do not have to have
temperature control, and many animals become sick or die when the trucks reach
ninety degrees or fall to below freezing temperatures. In some cases, animals have
actually frozen to the sides of the (metal) truck, and have to be pried off with
crowbars. Many animals die during shipping alone. If an animal is unlucky enough to
fall during transport, it may be crushed underfoot.
Those that make it to the slaughterhouse have no relief. They are urged to
exit the vehicle, which many do willingly. But others are timid, and so are shocked
with electric prods in their faces and rectums or dragged off with chains. Once off
the truck, cows are funneled into a chute where they are shot in the head with a
captive bolt. This is meant to render them insensible to pain. But the workers are
often ill-trained, and the shot does not always hit the mark so they continue to be
processed while still alive. Ramon Moreno, a slaughterhouse worker, told The
Washington Post that he often had to dismember conscious cows. “They blink. They
make noises,’ he says. ‘The head moves, the eyes are wide and looking around. …
They die piece by piece.’” (Warrick 2001) The cows are usually hung upside-down
by their legs, as they move down a precession line where their throats are slit. This
The 28-Hour Law is rife with loopholes, often ignored, and rarely enforced. For a few
examples: The law only applies to ground transport across state lines, and does not extend
to air or water transport. Sheep can be kept loaded for up to 36 hours. And any animal can
be kept for “36 consecutive hours when the owner or person having custody of animals being
transported requests, in writing and separate from a bill of lading or other rail form, that the 28hour period be extended to 36 hours.” The cost of violating the law is $100-$500.
4

7

is supposed to be a quick death. But, “Another worker, Martin Fuentes, told the Post
that many animals are still alive and conscious for as long as seven minutes after
their throats have been cut. ‘The line is never stopped simply because an animal is
alive.’” The particular accepted slaughter methods differ by animal, but the general
experience remains much the same.
Laboratory animals are also often the recipients of brutal treatment. Each
year in the U.S., about 100 million mice and rats are used in research (biomedical
experimentation, product and cosmetic testing, and science education), as are about
300,000 primates, cats, dogs and guinea pigs. (USDA 2019) Most of these animals
are bred specifically for laboratory use. The quality of their lives in the lab largely
depends on what sort of study they are being used in. Some studies are fairly benign.
These include most cognition tests, behavioral observations, and other non-invasive
tests that are meant to generate knowledge about the way animals behave on their
own and what cognitive capabilities they have. Even so, they are still generally kept
in a man-made environment, with limited social access, and an inability to perform
many of their species typical behaviors.
Some of the more invasive studies include the subjects being intentionally
addicted to drugs and cigarettes, kept in extreme isolation, deprived of basic bodily
needs such as sleep and food, intentionally caused pain, deafened, blinded,
vivisected, infected with or caused to develop diseases such as AIDS, Parkinson’s,
diabetes, and cancer, and much more. The army used to blow up pigs to test the
result of certain explosives. The animals are often are not given painkillers due to
the worry that relieving pain would skew the studies’ results. Most of these animals
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are used only once, and the majority either dies during the experiment (as in LD 50
tests where the goal is to determine what dosage of a toxic substance will kill 50%
of the population) or is euthanized after the experiment has concluded. Methods of
euthanization vary by species, largely depending on the animal’s size.
Zoos and aquariums are a third sort of environment in which we keep
animals, and they vary quite a bit in regards to how the animals are treated.5 Openrange zoos and safari parks tend to provide their animals with a large land area over
which to roam, including many natural aspects to the landscape. Because there is
space to move, they are not forced to continually encounter humans. They can often
form social groups and interact with other species in a relatively natural way. This is
much different than many popular zoos. While zoos tend to enjoy a relatively
positive reputation, many of them are, in fact, places where animals live in artificial,
stressful, and confined conditions. They are often deprived of mental and physical
stimulation and socialization. (Kleiman 2012) Many of these animals are kept in
concrete enclosures with little or no access to the natural environment. Many are
kept alone, and so suffer from unnatural isolation. Animals are often held in
locations that are very different from their natural climate. For instance, polar bears
are kept in many zoos which have much higher average temperatures than their
native ecosystem. Such changes put a lot of physical and mental stress on the
animals.
Animals in those conditions often suffer from various psychological
problems, informally called “zoochosis”. (Born Free n.d.) Symptoms of psychosis,
We can, for example, distinguish between roadside zoos, petting zoos, animal theme parks,
open range zoos, and safari parks.
5
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called stereotypical behaviors, include such behaviors as bar-biting, coprophagia,
self-mutilation, circling, rocking, swaying, pacing, rolling/twisting, head-nodding,
vomiting, excessive licking, and excessive grooming (often to the point of creating
lesions). Some zoo animals have caused themselves serious injury or death by these
actions. (Wolfensohn 2018) Additionally, zoos kill thousands of animals each year
because they are the result of unwanted breeding.
There are many more ways that animas are utilized, but I’ll close this section
by looking at pets, also called ‘companion animals.’ Of the uses listed in this section,
the use of animals as pets or companions is probably the least problematic. As of
2012, over 60% of American households had at least one pet. The number of owned
animals has tripled since the 1970’s, and there are about 180 million pets in the U.S.
(AVMA n.d.; PFMA 2015) Of these, about 4% enter the shelter system annually,
more than a third of which are euthanized. (ASPCA, n.d.) Even so, we know that
many pet owners love their animals, and often consider them part of the family.
Such inclusion frequently comes with enrichment tools (toys), high quality medical
care, and other benefits. But there are many pets who are not as lucky.
Many people adopt animals only to give them up because their place of
residence does not allow pets, they feel they do not have not enough time, the
animal has behavior issues, or the human has allergies. (Greenwood 2016) Further,
those who keep their pets often abuse them. Dogs, cats, horses, birds, and livestock
are frequently given inadequate food and water, forced to stay outside in extreme
conditions with little to no shelter, kicked, whipped, or otherwise beaten, made to
fight other animals to incapacitation or death, and so on. Thousands of these cases
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are reported every year, and undoubtedly many more go unreported.6 This is
despite the fact that all 50 states have felony provisions within their animal cruelty
laws. (Wisch 2010)

III. Current Animal Protection Laws
Some places in the world have begun to restrict some of the ways we
mistreat animals. In this country, Illinois, Oregon, Maine, California, and Michigan
stand out as leading the way with legal protections for animals. California is in many
ways our country’s most progressive state when it comes to redefining what the
boundaries of humane treatment are. In 2015, California passed a law banning
routine use of antibiotics in animal agriculture. This will likely mean that animals
will receive more humane treatment in order to prevent the diseases CA farmers
used to prevent through those drugs. They have also outlawed battery cages for
hens, and intend to extend this rule to require that each hen will have enough space
to stand up, lie down, turn around, and spread her wings without touching another
hen. (LA Times 2014) Despite limited improvements in individual states’ laws, I will
focus on federal laws for the rest of this section, as it is the federal level at which I
will make my proposal for legal reform.
Most agree that a large-scale, organized movement for animal welfare began
in the U.S. in the 1960’s and 70’s. As we will see, even though the addition of animal
welfare laws is straightforwardly a good thing, these laws all leave a lot to be
desired. Let us consider three of these laws in detail, beginning with the well-known
Interestingly, there is a correlation between domestic violence and animal abuse. 71% of
violence victims report that their abuser also targeted their animal (Ascione, 1997).
6
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Animal Welfare Act (AWA). This law was first passed in 1966, though it has seen
several revisions since, most recently in 2008. It is really the central animal
protection law, because, as stated by the USDA, “It is the only Federal law in the
United States that regulates the treatment of animals in research, exhibition,
transport, and by dealers. Other laws, policies, and guidelines may include
additional species coverage or specifications for animal care and use, but all refer to
the Animal Welfare Act as the minimum acceptable standard.” (n.d., par. 1)
In the AWA, we see a sort of bifurcated attention paid to animals. There are
many standards of minimum care described in the law, and these standards do
appear to stem from a concern to minimize suffering. For example, part of the stated
purpose of the document is to “assure the humane treatment of animals during
transportation in commerce.” (§2131.2 AWA) Another example comes later in the
section regulating animal care, treatment, and practices in research facilities,
specifying that “animal pain and distress are minimized, including adequate
veterinary care with the appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizing
drugs, or euthanasia.” (2143.3a AWA)
Even though there is no justification for such criteria expressed there, or
anywhere else in the text of the law, one is left with the sense that the law is
intended to prevent an unnecessarily high level of animal suffering for the sake of
the beings themselves, and not (solely) in virtue of their value to humans. And to
some extent, that appearance is confirmed by the simple observation that if we
cared not for animal suffering, many aspects of research operations, animal housing,
etc. would be made easier and cheaper without these minimum standards. There is
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clearly some form of moral obligation that lawmakers appear to feel toward
minimizing suffering that is not based in making human lives easier.
On the other hand, human needs and wants clearly trump objective
valuations of different species in ways that are not scientifically justifiable. Dogs are
the prime example of such a case. The AWA contains three sections that solely
regulate treatment of dogs and cats (2135, 2137, and 2138), and an additional
section (2148) only regarding dogs. The section “Protection of Pets” (2158) is also
only about dogs and cats. No other animals covered by the law have even one
dedicated section. Dogs and cats are also afforded extra considerations throughout
the law. For example, section 2140 includes this requirement for record keeping
(emphasis added):
Dealers and exhibitors shall make and retain for such reasonable period of
time as the Secretary may prescribe, such records with respect to the
purchase, sale, transportation, identification, and previous ownership of
animals as the Secretary may prescribe. Research facilities shall make and
retain such records only with respect to the purchase, sale, transportation,
identification, and previous ownership of live dogs and cats.

Such exception also occurs in 2141. Further, in section 2143.a2B, dogs are specified
as the only animals for which exercise is required.
Let us move on to look at the limited definition of “animal” in 2132g
(emphasis added):
The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate
mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the
Secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research,
testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term
excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for
use in research, (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm
animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use
as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving
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animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency, or for
improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog, the term means all
dogs including those used for hunting, security, or breeding purposes…

The definition does not include animals used as food, including cows and pigs.
Nowadays, there is a lot of evidence that pigs lead internally complex lives, on par
with or beyond the internal lives of most dogs. Pigs have been shown to possess rich
emotional lives, complex and meaningful social groups, and the ability to make great
companion animals. (Marino & Colvin 2015) Given all this, the distinction in the law
between dogs and pigs must arise from social norms rather than from an objective
valuation of the animals. Dogs are commonly loved as pets and are named “man’s
best friend”; pigs are usually neither. In this country, we would not accept the use of
dogs as food, but we readily accept this use of pigs, and this double standard is
reflected in our laws. So there is an undeniable social aspect to the AWA and other
animal protection laws. For example, two other prominent laws regarding animal
protection, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA),
can be shown to contain the same split.
The ESA is meant to protect (in so far as they are in their natural habitats)
endangered or threatened plant and animal species. The law states early on that
humans are responsible for many extinctions, saying, “various species of fish,
wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation” (2.a.1) We see further that the law is committed to
“provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the
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conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such
steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and
conventions.” (2.b)
One notable difference between the ESA and the AWA is that the ESA does
not exclude whole categories of animal from its jurisdiction. In section 3.8, it is
explicitly stated that the law applies to “any member of the animal kingdom,
including without limitation any mammal, fish, bird, … amphibian, reptile, mollusk,
crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate, and includes any part, product, egg, or
offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts thereof” (emphasis added). This is a
much more comprehensive law insofar as all animals are included, and perhaps
most interestingly, all invertebrates.7 In particular, this law does not appear to make
the large compromises in favor of human interests that the AWA does.
This all seems good. However, if we look again, it becomes clear that the
underlying motivation for this law is not to benefit the animals themselves. In two
places, the document states that these provisions are based on human concerns. In
2.a.3 we read, “[T]hese species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people…” That is, they are worth protecting because they are valuable to us. Shortly
after this, the sentiment is further clarified by identifying our commitment is to
“better safe-guarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish,
wildlife, and plants.” “Citizen” only refers to humans. Therefore, despite the
expanded range of the ESA’s reach, it is clearly motivated by human interests, and
There is one exception for insects that present an “overwhelming and overriding” risk to
humans. (3.6)
7
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protects endangered species only insofar as biodiversity is instrumentally valuable
to us.
Lastly, we’ll turn to the Humane Slaughter Act (HSA).8 This law is intended to
regulate how animal products are processed, from slaughter to distribution. I’ll be
focusing here on the regulations regarding slaughter. In section 1, we read
“[T]he congress finds that the use of humane methods in the slaughter of livestock
prevents needless suffering; results in better and safer working conditions for
persons engaged in the slaughtering industry; brings about improvement of
products and economies in slaughtering operations; and produces other benefits
for producers, processors, and consumers which tend to expedite an orderly flow of
livestock and livestock products in interstate and foreign commerce.”

Of the four reasons for humane slaughter, only one is based on a moral
consideration of animals; but it is first on the list. Further, that reason is not put in
terms of human needs, nor is there any reason to interpret it that way. Now
consider the definition of “humane slaughter.” It is when:
“a) In the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock, all
animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical,
chemical, or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted,
thrown, cast, or cut; or
b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Islamic and
Jewish faith … whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the
brain…”

In practice, the most common methods of slaughter are electrocution, CO2 stunning,
and captive bolt stunning. Such methods are supposedly instantaneous and render
the animal unconscious, but there is reason to doubt both of these claims. (Grandin
& Smith 2004) Further, the Act defines being unconscious only as making no effort
to right oneself. This is clearly an insufficient criterion. There are many cases in

8

Formally called the Act of August 27, 1958, 7USC 1901-1907.
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which an animal may be temporarily paralyzed while maintaining full
consciousness, including the ability to feel pain. (Warrick 2001)
Perhaps the most egregious failing of the HSA, however, is its exclusion of the
vast majority of animals who are slaughtered in the U.S. each year, including poultry
and fish. Poultry (the majority of which are chickens) and fish each constitute a
much larger percentage of all animals killed for food than the animals protected by
the law. (Meyers 2016) As I will describe in Chapter Two, the science indicates that
all vertebrates have the requisite physical structures for pain experiences, and many
of them are also capable of some aspects of psychological suffering, such as stress
and fear. Therefore, any law that presents itself as caring to minimize animal
suffering cannot consistently exclude such animals.
As an aside, I have focused this section on American law, though the same
sorts of issues can be seen in many nation states throughout the world. An in-depth
look at international law, though fascinating, would be outside the scope of this
paper. Therefore, I will continue to discuss American law, and make suggestions
regarding only the American legal system. I think it will be clear, however, that my
suggestions could be expanded to other countries, or perhaps even to an
international treaty regarding animal treatment.

IV. What to Expect in the Chapters Ahead
I have so far endeavored to make clear that our current way of incorporating
animals into the U.S. legal system is inadequate. There is a lot of precedence for
arguing that all pain and suffering should be morally considerable. In philosophy we
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have many ethical systems that incorporate this intuition, including Bentham’s
utilitarianism, Singer’s preference utilitarianism, Regan’s rights view, feminist
ethics, and so on.
I will therefore begin in Chapter Two by establishing the long and growing
tradition of considering sentience as the only morally acceptable cut-off for moral
consideration. I will also reference the growing body of scientific evidence that
many animals are sentient and experience suffering. While such a position has been
well established in philosophy, it has been stunted in the legal arena by the false
dichotomy of personhood and property. Given these considerations, it is long past
time that our legal system caught up to our philosophical and scientific knowledge
to provide more, and more robust, protections for sentient animals.
In making a case for sentiocentrism, I will have to clarify the various ways in
which the term is used, and how I intend to use it. While there is much that
sentiocentric views agree on, there is often an underlying assumption about what
‘sentience’ refers to that can confuse the discussion. Sentience can be described as
an aspect of consciousness, a cognitive ability, the ability to perceive, the general
ability to feel, or the specific ability to feel pain and/or suffer. As an aspect of
consciousness, it may refer to the ability to have subjective experience. As a
cognitive ability, it may require certain processing structures in the body and the
brain. The abilities to perceive and feel are perhaps the broadest definitions of
sentience, as they do not specify the nature of those perceptions or feelings. Finally,
I take the ability to feel pain and/or suffer as being the same as having the ability to
experience an event as negatively valenced.
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It may turn out that all normally developed beings who possess one of these
abilities possess them all, but I will not assume that to be the case. Further, I am
making a moral argument, and as such will use the definition that I consider to be
the most morally relevant: the ability to feel pain and/or suffer. It may turn out that
this ability is a matter of degree, but this will not affect my proposal. I take the
question of whether an animal is sentient to be a "yes" or "no" question, even while
acknowledging that all pain and suffering may not be similar to humans', or perhaps
even recognizable to us. Once an animal has passed the threshold of sentience, it
automatically belongs to the category of sentient nonperson (SNP). If any
considerations of degree are to be taken into account, they lie outside the scope of
the current project. In this chapter, I will also discuss objections to sentiocentrism
and do my best to show their inadequacy. While sentiocentrism alone cannot solve
all moral dilemmas, I believe it should be one of the central pillars of our applied
ethics.
Chapter Three will focus on the distinction between animal abolitionists,
animal welfare advocates, and animal rights advocates, with the understanding that
these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I will discuss the central ideological
and methodological differences between them, including disagreements that arise
within each group itself. Gary Francione will be the primary representative of the
abolitionists, Robert Garner will be one example of a welfarist, and Steven Wise will
be discussed as offering what we might term “partial abolitionism”. We will also
look at a couple other views, including Shelly Kagan’s hierarchical view and
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s citizenship model.
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I will argue that abolition is both unattainable socially, and unnecessary to
secure compassionate treatment for sentient beings. I agree with Francione to the
extent that sentience is the only acceptable threshold for determining which animals
should matter, but I feel that he takes his prescriptions for actions much further
than they need be taken. In particular, I will disagree with his insistence on ending
animal companionship (i.e. having pets), and raise several objections to his claim
that animal research is never morally justified.
Welfarists usually focus on improving the conditions of the animals in our
care, without necessarily allowing them any rights beyond mere protection. They do
not necessarily object to the designation of animals as property, but only to the
mistreatment of property that happens to be capable of suffering. I will argue that
this, too, is insufficient, since it does not recognize the sentient animal as a legal
entity which itself deserves consideration, but rather as beings to which we only
owe indirect or discretionary duties.
Steven Wise does not argue for abolitionism, but rather that certain animals
are deserving of legal personhood, and thus, human-like rights. While this is an
admirable goal, and is perhaps the right thing to do for particular species such as
gorillas and dolphins, it is still insufficient. No matter how many species are
eventually granted legal personhood, there will be many leftover species who are
sentient, but fall well below the required cognitive threshold for consideration as a
person.
Kagan puts his discussion in terms of a hierarchy of value, which distracts
from rather than clarifies the current issues. He focuses very heavily on agency,
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considering it more important than sentience. This view and his reasons for it are
both flawed, and so sentience comes to play a suppressed role in his theory, while I
believe it should be central. He also provides several ad hoc arguments for giving
humans more value than other animals that appear to be based in human
exceptionalism.
I will argue that each of these positions is insufficient to accommodate
sentient nonpersons within our legal and social framework.
In Chapter Four, I will discuss existing legal distinctions in U.S. law. In today’s
legal environment there are two legal categories: legal personalities and property.
This is not sufficient. Legal personhood is generally restricted to those with certain
high-level cognitive abilities, while everything else is relegated to the realm of
property (or else it is not even regarded at all). If a person is injured by another
person, there is legal recourse and compensation available for that individual. If a
sentient nonperson is injured, there is no legal recourse or compensation for that
being. All that exists is punishment for the doer of the injury and possible removal of
the injured.
Here, I will aim to make the landscape of current issues in personhood clear,
both in the legal and philosophical realms. First I will elaborate on the two currently
existing legal categories, personalities and property, and the implications that result
from assigning something to one of these groups. Specifically, only those considered
persons under our laws have any legal standing to sue on their own behalf to make
themselves whole if injured. Persons come in a variety of shapes, and with a variety
of rights. I will lay out the similarities and differences between these types of
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persons, raising issue with the seeming inconsistency of applying the same term to
such disparate beings, while excluding all nonhuman entities as a matter of course.
In regards to personhood, I will also be discussing Supreme Court cases that give
corporations certain rights.
I also wish to highlight the difference between holding rights and merely
being protected under the law. Essential to this discussion will be the observation
that inanimate objects and sentient animals are both considered property, and
therefore only afforded protection. At the same time, our laws clearly indicates a
preference for avoiding “unnecessary harm” to certain animals, while they indicate
no such concern for inanimate objects. One important aspect to our property laws
thus appears to be that not all property is truly equal. While calling all sentient
animals persons would be an error, I will argue that putting them in the same
category as inanimate objects is a far more egregious error. I will emphasize this
discrepancy as a problem that my proposal will aim to resolve.
I will then argue that while personhood is an interesting, and perhaps useful,
category, it is far too restrictive to be the only morally significant, legally recognized
designation. I believe modern day efforts to expand the circle of personhood by
abolitionists and animal rights activists (to fetuses, nonhuman, animals, rivers, and
so on) largely stem from a conviction that sentient beings should not be property.
Though I agree with that claim, I do not believe that all sentient beings are deserving
of legal personhood either. Welfarists and abolitionists have long been at odds over
the correct way to incorporate nonhumans into our society.
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I believe part of the discrepancy is due to the fact that we lack the legal
framework to deal with beings which are neither property nor persons. In this
paper, I will outline a new legal category, legal patiency, which would provide
certain rights to sentient nonpersons. I will explain the philosophical import of such
a move, and how it may be practically applied in the current U.S. legal system.
By Chapter Five, I will have argued that all sentient beings are morally
important, and that our current legal system which divides all beings into persons
and property contains both gaps and inconsistencies. In this section, I will suggest a
way to fix this. Importantly, I will not be suggesting that we treat all sentient beings
as persons, nor that all animals are sentient. Likewise, I will not try to identify
exactly which animals may be deserving of legal personhood. Whether or not any
animals should be considered as persons is really irrelevant to my thesis, and I will
explain why this is the case.
The animals I will be discussing are those that are sentient nonpersons
(SNP’s). These beings are deserving of some legal rights so that they receive more
than mere protection under the law. But what kind of rights would those be, and
how could they be accommodated in our current legal system? I will discuss two
main categories of rights that such animals need. The first is some degree of
freedom from bodily harm or injury, and the second is the right to receive
recompense directly for any harm or injury done to it by the ability to bring a civil
case to court and sue for damages. I will use existing establishments and explain
how they can be expanded to accommodate this legal category.
Lastly, Chapter Six will provide an explanation of how I envision this
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framework being applied in practice. This will include both legal and social effects,
and the degree to which the SNP’s rights must be regarded. I will also give examples
of case studies, and how specific situations may be resolved under such a system. As
with any new proposal, the specific guidelines would need to be worked out, but the
underlying philosophy would provide the framework for fleshing out the necessary
regulations and processes by which this goal would be realized.
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Chapter 2: Sentience matters – Animal Pain and Suffering
All animals that can experience negative sensations are sentient on my
account, and thus will fit into my proposed category of legal patiency. That being
said, I will not offer a conclusive account of which animals, specifically, will be
included and excluded. For one, I am not a pain scientist. Much of the necessary
work to figure out which species are sentient has yet to be done, and once it has
been, those involved in the research should be the ones who decide what the results
mean. Secondly, I am not a legislator. Once science has presented the relevant
information, it is the legislators who must decide how that information fills out the
ethical system I am laying out, and therefore how it will apply in any particular
domain. I am therefore going to set aside a great range of important questions in
order to focus on animals that are relatively well understood to us.
Despite our lack of certainty in the realm of animal experience, there are
some things we do know. There is a wealth of data demonstrating that many species
of animal can suffer.9 We have some ideas as to what physical markers indicate the
ability to feel pain, and we have a fair amount of evidence that many animals have
those. I will review some of that data here in order to demonstrate that suffering is a
widespread occurrence that requires much more of us than we currently give.

Some of the literature distinguishes between “pain” and “suffering,” although I do not place
emphasis on that distinction here. First, I assume that any animal capable of suffering is also
capable of pain. There may be a few individuals with medical conditions for whom this is
not true, but that should not affect my overall argument. Second, as I am concerned with
who is capable of pain, not individual instances of it, I do not think it is important to name
every negative sensation precisely. See Bueno-Gomez (2017) for a discussion of the
distinction.
9
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Animal cognition research does not focus on sentience per se. It has mainly
concentrated on specific areas of social cognition such as theory of mind, deception,
individual recognition, etc. Most relevantly, there has been a fair amount of research
on pain. The term ‘pain’ is reserved for the subjective feeling of a particular sort of
discomfort, which is usually thought of as localized, having a specific duration, and
having certain qualities. The International Association for the Study of Pain defines
pain as “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.” However, it goes on
to say that “Activity induced in the nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is
not pain, which is always a psychological state, even though we may appreciate that
pain most often has a proximate physical cause” (IASP 2017)
These definitions clearly indicate that the experience of pain requires
sentience. If sentience involves the ability to experience subjectively, and pain is one
type of subjective experience (whatever else it may or may not be), then pain
requires sentience. Therefore, we may use the pain research as a minimum standard
for determining which animals are sentient without fear of over-ascription. In the
following pages I will focus on this research, and in so doing, assume that all animals
who feel pain are sentient and are consequently deserving of some legal standing.
In fact, one can identify three categories of animals: 1. Those who can almost
certainly suffer, 2. Those who most likely cannot suffer, and 3. Those who fall in a
gray area between the two. While there are many species of animal whose ability to
suffer is understudied and about which we know very little, there are several groups
who are clearly capable of it and I will place these in the first category. I will not be
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discussing animals in the second group in any real detail due to the low likelihood of
their sentience. Such animals include insects (as discussed by C.H. Eismann et al.)
and those such as sea cucumbers that appear to have no real brain. (Barnes 1982).
The animals in the third group are often those species whose physiological
structures and markers differ significantly from humans, but who nevertheless
engage in some pain behavior. We simply don’t know enough about these creatures
to reach a conclusion. Should it turn out that any such species can, in fact, feel pain,
they would be included in my rubric. In the meantime, and for the purposes of
future chapters, I will only accommodate the likely candidates.

I. Nociception, Pain, and Identifying Sentience
Part of the difficulty in making pain determinations is that it is very hard to
obtain empirical evidence of pain. As Peter Singer points out, “Pain is a state of
consciousness, a ‘mental event’, and as such it can never be observed.” (1990) Nor
can we just ask most animals, the way we can ask most humans, whether or not
they’re experiencing it. We cannot observe pain, but we can observe nociceptive
processes. ‘Nociception’ refers to the capacity to sense noxious stimuli, and includes
both conscious and subconscious responses to such stimuli. Nociceptive receptors
are a certain kind of nerve ending that is present all over the body. (Basbaum et al.
2009) The nociceptors send signals through the body’s peripheral nerves to the
spinal cord and thus to the brain. (Giordano, 2005) There are different types of
nociceptors that respond to different sorts of stimuli, but they all share the same
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job: alerting the body and/or brain to potential physical harm. (Moseley 2012; Fein
2014)
In much of the scientific and philosophical literature, the presence of
nociceptors has been used as a shortcut to concluding that an animal feels pain. This
often makes use of the dual assumptions that 1. Nociception is necessary for pain,
and 2. Nociception is sufficient for pain. In other words, some writers accept that
one cannot have pain experiences if nociception is absent. Such a view would imply
that only animals with nociceptors are even capable of suffering in any way. Further,
some accept that the discovery of nociceptors in another species is enough to
conclude that the species can feel pain. Such suppositions are rarely identified, and
are likely made for the sake of convenience. (Moseley 2012) But are they justified?
Regarding the first assumption, there are kinds of discomfort which do not
appear to depend directly on peripheral neuronal stimulation. Emotional suffering
is like this, but so is the pain some humans feel in phantom limbs. Generally
speaking, there are many instances of pain perception which seem to be initiated in
the brain rather than by an external stimulus which damages the body. While
nociception is not necessary for individual experiences of pain, it may be the case
that nociception is a prerequisite for the general ability to feel pain. In other words,
it may be that only animals with nociceptors have developed the cognitive
architecture required to experience negatively charged sensations of any kind. This
would mean that only animals with nociceptors feel pain. While we do not have a
definitive answer on the matter, I have no direct objection to such an assumption at
this time. Regarding the second assumption, nociception is not sufficient to indicate
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a pain experience. There are nociceptive processes which result in no unpleasant
sensation, such as a cut that you don’t notice until well after it has clotted and
started to heal. More generally, it is thought that nociception appears at an earlier
stage evolutionarily than pain perception, so that there may be any number of
animals in whom we can observe the former without being confident in the
presence of the latter. (Brandeis 2010) Victoria Braithwaite discusses the
distinction between nociception and conscious experiences of pain in her book Do
Fish Feel Pain? She says, “pain is not just single process, but rather a series of
separate events” many of which take place unconsciously. Therefore, “just because
an animal detects injuries through nociception does not mean that they feel pain
too.” (31, 33)
Therefore, although we can use nociceptive processes as a starting point for
identifying which SNP’s feel pain, we must also consider other aspects of the animal
in order to make more confident deductions. Researchers often defer to the
“argument by analogy” in these realms: if an event is painful or distressing to
humans, it is possible that a similar event would have similar effects on animals with
comparable physiologies and behavior. 10 Likewise, similar responses may indicate
similar experiences, “The presence of pain in an animal cannot be known for certain,
but it can be inferred through physical and behavioral reactions.” (Abbot et al. 1995)
There are generally three types of indicators that take place when trying to
determine whether or not a particular animal is (or is capable of) suffering. Those
are physiological changes (including nociception), behavioral changes, and
Though popular among animal scientists, this view is not without naysayers: Harrison
1991, for example.
10
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structural similarity. (Bateson 1991; Sneddon 2014) These known and suspected
markers of pain may occur at both the micro and macro levels. For instance,
physiological elements such nociceptors and endogenous opioids are possible
indicators at the micro level. At the macro level, we may look for behavioral changes
and structural similarity. I will examine these categories and then show how each
applies to the different classes of vertebrate.
From the physiological standpoint, there are at least three important things
we may look for: nociceptors, opioids, and physical changes. It is likely that the
presence of nociceptors and physical changes are necessary, though not sufficient to
indicate pain experiences, while the presence of opioids may be sufficient but not
necessary. Nociceptors respond to three types of stimulus: chemical, mechanical,
and thermal.11 They also stimulate a variety of responses including reflex
withdrawal, autonomic responses, and pain. (Everaerts et al. 2011) Mechanical
nociceptors respond to higher levels of pressure and incisions. Chemical nociceptors
respond to a wide variety of noxious chemicals, including certain spices and spider
toxins. (Woolf & Ma 2007) If these are not present, then we do not know what might
account for the perception of bodily injury. The second physiological marker is
endogenous opioids (such as endorphins) that are neurochemicals known to
moderate pain in mammals. (Rech at al. 2012) The opioid system involves widely
scattered neurons that make three opioids that act as neurotransmitters and
neuromodulators at certain receptors and lead to analgesia, or pain relief. (Holden
There are also nociceptors that respond to none of these, but appear to be sensitive to
inflammation. These are not well understood and do appear to follow rather than initiate
the body’s response. For these reasons, I won’t rely on their presence to make
determinations regarding which animals feel pain. (Jessell et al. 1991)
11
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et al. 2005) The interesting thing about opioids is that moderating pain appears to
be their main, if not only, function. It is therefore a strong indication of pain
experience. Thirdly, physical changes include subconscious, physiological responses
such as changes in heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood pressure. These things are
often used to assess pain in humans and other animals, but can be quite unreliable
and nonspecific; similar changes may be observed in excited or mating animals, for
instance. (NRC 2009)
Pain behaviors are a second kind of pain indicator which must not be
ignored. Although, like nociception, they may be neither necessary nor sufficient to
indicate pain. To see that it is not necessary, consider some of the instances in which
human pain experiences are not accompanied by pain behaviors. These range from
extreme cases such as paralysis, to the familiar refusal to act as if one is hurting for
any number of (often) social reasons. Pain behavior is also not sufficient to indicate
pain as both humans and other animals have been documented as acting injured
without any actual injury. Take, for example, the well-known case of the piping
plover who will act as if she has a broken wing in order to lure a predator away from
the nest. (Potter & Abbot 2012)
Behaviorally, there are a large number of actions (or inactions) that may
indicate pain. These behaviors may be intentional or unintentional, linguistic and/or
communicative, and be demonstrated through either excitations or depressions of
activity. Since behaviors are generally externally observable, they can be recorded
and measured more easily than the endogenous processes mentioned below.
However, given the wide range of pain responses, identifying them is not always a
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straightforward task, and a comprehensive list will vary depending on whom you
ask. Keefe et al. include in their list “complaints of pain, reductions in activity,
increased medication intake, or alterations in facial expressions or body posture” for
humans, and “withdrawal from the painful stimulus or other self-protective
maneuvers” for animals. (1991, p. 3) Other lists are much longer, including such
things as facial grimaces and winces, crying out, restlessness, rubbing the affected
area, distorted posture/mobility, fatigue, and insomnia. (Feldt 2000; Vlaeyen et al.
1987) Despite the wide range, many of these behaviors will be recognizable to us as
we often respond to pain similarly. A second issue is that sometimes the very act of
observation changes the behavior of the observed, as is the case with rabbits and
guinea pigs, who may remain immobile in the presence of unfamiliar persons. If a
rabbit is suffering, he may only display pain behaviors when no human is around.
These concerns are further complicated by the fact that species vary widely in their
pain responses, and individuals of the same species will respond differently to
different types of pain. (NRC 2009) Therefore, any extrapolations from behavior to
pain must involve a lot of guesswork, and so we use behavioral information in
tandem with other considerations to arrive at a more complete picture.
Structural similarity, such as having a central nervous system, may represent
a more direct connection to pain experience, although this, too, is not a necessary
condition. We use the human case as a basis for determining which structures are
involved in pain, but it is entirely possible that other creatures have different pain
recognition and processing systems, so that animals lacking the same architecture
as humans may nevertheless suffer. There are certainly some interesting structures
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out there, as can be seen in the case of the octopus who has, in addition to a central
brain, what we might call “mini-brains” in each of her tentacles. (Godfrey-Smith
2016) The argument might also be made that structural similarity is not sufficient
for pain similarity. But if there were (and there often are) structural similarities in
pain processing mechanisms between those who certainly feel pain and those who
possibly feel pain, one who denies that those with similar structures can suffer
would seem to have the burden of proof. This common sense, better-safe-than-sorry
policy is Singer’s view (1990), and I tend to agree. If another creature shares our
basic pain-sensing structures, then it makes more sense to treat them as painfeeling, at least in the absence of convincing countervailing evidence.
Structural similarities we look for include a central nervous system (CNS), a
rudimentary cortex, and possibly a neocortex. The cortex is a part of the brain
common to all vertebrates, and is thought to play a central role in many higher-level
cognitive abilities such as memory and perceptual awareness. (Zimmer 2010) The
neocortex evolved later, and is unique to mammals. It is thought to be the seat of
such functions as cognition, consciousness, and language. (Rakic 2009) In humans,
pain impulses are transmitted from the site of injury to the spinal cord, and then to
the brain stem and thalamus. The brain does not have a dedicated pain center, and
so the stimuli are processed in multiple areas of the brain, each with certain
functions. This is one reason that pain processing is not simple to detect. 12

The three main areas that we know are involved in pain processing are: 1. The reticular
system, which connects the brain stem to the cortex, triggers automatic responses such as
flinching when something comes at your face. It is also responsible for affectivemotivational responses such as looking at and assessing the injury. 2. The somatosensory
cortex plays an important role in the perception and interpretation of sensations. It
12
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If an animal were to exhibit all or most of these various pain indicators, we
could feel pretty confident that they feel pain. I will not claim that possession of
these is the only way an animal might have developed the ability to feel pain; that
would be anthropomorphic hubris. But, taken together, these various markers seem
to me more than sufficient. Peter Singer sums up this idea:
“[Since] nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can
be seen in other species … It is surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems
that are virtually identical physiologically, have a common origin and a common
evolutionary function, and result in similar forms of behavior in similar
circumstances should actually operate in an entirely different manner on the level of
subjective feelings.” (1990)

In other words, if an animal were to exhibit all three of these markers, the burden of
proof would lie with the pain denier to indicate evidence to the contrary.

A. Which Animals are Almost Certainly Sentient?
It is commonly accepted that mammalian species are clear cases of animals
who can suffer. (Smith 1991) Physiologically, they possess all three of the markers
we are looking for: nociceptors, opioids, and physical changes. In fact, all mammals
appear to have the same types of nociceptors as humans: chemical, thermal, and
mechanical. Mammals also possess endogenous opioids, which play an important
role in pain transmission and reward mechanisms. (Dreborg et al. 2008; Stefano et
al. 2012) Physically, it has been well-documented that mammals react in many of
the same ways as humans do in the presence of painful stimuli. They exhibit
recognizes the intensity, type, and location of the pain sensation and relates it to past
experiences. 3. The limbic system, which acts as a sort of bridge between the cortex and
lower region of the brain, is responsible both for the emotional and behavioral responses to
pain and processing pain in terms of past experiences. (Nursing Times 2008)
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increased heart rate, higher blood pressure, faster respiration, changes to their
blood-cell counts, etc. (Carstens & Moberg 2000; National Research Council et al.
1992) Structurally, they possess an extremely similar sensory architecture to
humans, and they share with humans the possession of slow and fast pain pathways.
Pain is also transmitted through their CNS’s in the same way as ours. (Sherwood et
al. 2012) They have the same three areas of the brain that are involved in human
pain. Further, all mammals possess at least a small neocortex, which is thought to
process pain and suffering through “higher” cognitive processes. So if higher pain
processing is reliant on this piece of architecture (which I doubt, but some believe)
then they are good candidates. Behaviorally, each species shows most if not all of
the pain behaviors that humans do, excepting (perhaps) the linguistic markers. One
point that bears note is that not all mammals express pain in the same situations
that a human would. For instance, some prey animals, such as elk, will not always
cry out when injured in order to avoid alerting prey to their location. Some animals
also have a high pain threshold, such as cats who walk on broken limbs. We are not
looking for identical behaviors in identical situations, but in the broader context of
their day-to-day lives.
Despite a greater difference from humans in all three of these areas, birds are
another class of vertebrate that can almost certainly suffer. While birds do not have
neocorteces, they do possess at least a cortex, which some argue is necessary for
processing pain as a negative sensation rather than simply as an aversive stimulus.
(Key, 2016) Since there has only been serious analysis of pain done on a small
number of the approximately 10,000 species of birds, these conclusions come from a
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few genera that are considered representative of the class. 13 In fact, the majority of
our knowledge about bird physiology comes from pigeons and domestic poultry.
(Gartrell n.d.)
Starting with the physiology, we see three types of nociceptors identified in
chickens specifically: thermal-receptors, mechanical receptors, and pain receptors
(aka chemical receptors). (Gentle 1992) Of these, Gentle says, ““it is clear that in
terms of discharge patterns and receptive field size, they [nociceptors] are very
similar to those found in a variety of mammalian species.” Birds, like mammals, he
says, have “a well developed sensory system to monitor very precisely external
noxious or potentially noxious stimuli.” (p. 237-8) Also, endogenous opioids appear
to affect sensory input processing and memory in birds, (Reiner et al. 1994) and
they have some similar opioid receptors to humans. (Danbury et al. 1998) Physical
changes are also evident in chickens experiencing potential pain events, most
notably their heart and respiratory rates increase rapidly when subjected to certain
stimuli14 (Gentle 2011) as does their blood pressure. (Gentle et al. 1992)
Structurally, a bird’s skin possesses sensory nerve endings, capable of
detecting heat, cold, pressure, and pain. They have a central nervous system which
is structured and functions similarly to that of mammals, integrating sensory
impulses and storing learned information. (Ornithology 2016) One main difference
is that birds’ brains do not possess a neocortex. The structure of the bird brain is
admittedly quite different from the structure of the mammalian brain, however,
13

If this assumption turns out to be false, I will revise the conclusions accordingly.
Physical changes like these can indicate stress rather than pain per se. (See Grandin
2002) But under my broad definition of pain as any aversive stimulus negatively perceived,
certain kinds of stress may be included.
14
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recent studies have shown that birds have parts and cells in their brains which
appear to preform similar functions to the mammalian neocortex. (Wood 2018)
Behaviorally, birds exhibit many of the same behaviors as humans and other
mammals do, and they do so in situations which mammals would find painful. They
exhibit efforts to escape, distress cries, guarding of wounded body parts, passive
immobility, feather picking, increased aggression, anorexia, absence of speciestypical behaviors, and so on. (Gentle and Hunter 1990)
Despite all these similarities, it is necessary to point out that bird pain
perception and behavioral expression are also different from mammals’ in
important ways. Prey species tend to have the more subtle pain behaviors which can
easily go undetected to the untrained eye. In some cases, even veterinarians are only
able to assess bird pain through their response to analgesia. Despite these
considerations, Gentle concludes, “close similarity between birds and mammals in
their physiological and behavioral responses to painful stimuli would argue for a
comparable sensory and emotional experience.” (p. 243) Brett Gartrell likewise has
determined “it is beyond doubt that birds are able to perceive pain.” (n.d.)

B. The Jury is Out on Some Animals…
There are many species that will fall in the gray area, including fish, reptiles,
amphibians, mollusks, crustaceans, and others. Those that are vertebrates are the
most likely among this group to experience suffering as they have more highly
developed brains and advanced nervous systems. In fact, many researchers are
coming to believe that all or most vertebrates experience pain. (Abbot et al. 1995)
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They exhibit cephalization which may be crucial to integrating various bodily
experiences in a way that can be processed as a single pain event. It is also likely
that a complete endogenous opioid system was developed early in vertebrate
evolution. (Dreborg et al. 2008)
All vertebrates have a central nervous system and at least a rudimentary
cortex. Fish have been shown to record noxious stimuli in higher brain areas
(Dunlop and Laming 2005; Nordgreen et al. 2007), and certain reptiles seem to have
the requisite neurochemistry. (Kavaliers et al. 1984) But the exact way that pain
gets processed in the brain is an extremely complicated matter, particularly since
there is a lot of disagreement. For that reason, I will not go into more detail here, but
merely point out that the presence of the cortex in many animals makes it at least
plausible that many of them can suffer.
However, there has been very little research done on other vertebrate
groups: reptiles, fish, and amphibians.15 And there has been even less done on
invertebrates. So I will recuse myself from a discussion of pain in these animals and
only make arguments based on mammalian and avian abilities to suffer.

II. Sentiocentrism: Why suffering is the right threshold
Based on the above considerations, I therefore take it as a given that many
species of animals can suffer, even if that suffering is not identical or experienced to
the same degree as human suffering. In this section, I will argue the position that

For evidence of endogenous opioids in the various vertebrate classes, as well as for
differences in their respective functions, see West et al.’s Zoo and Animal Wildlife:
Immobilization and aneasthesia.
15
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such suffering matters morally. To make this claim is not to argue that all suffering
should be eliminated. Not only would that task be impossible, it would also reveal a
gross misunderstanding of pain itself. For much of pain is useful, both from an
evolutionary standpoint and from a social one. But we can agree that there is a lot of
suffering that can be eliminated without any major loss of life function or meaning.
(An exact specification of which types are which is beyond my abilities.) Here I will
expand upon the moral importance of suffering in general, and why I believe that
“beings who can suffer” is the right group to include in our realm of ethical concern.
First, it should be made clear that sentiocentrism is a well-established
philosophical position, and so the arguments rehearsed below are from that
literature. I do not aim to add new arguments that being sentient qualifies one for
moral consideration, but an acceptance of the arguments presented is central to my
larger project.
In a nutshell, sentience is the ability to experience perceptions subjectively.16
These sensations are called “qualia” in Western philosophy, and are seen as
necessary for the ability to suffer. It may be that all beings who possess qualia are
also capable of suffering, but if this is true, it would seem to be a contingent fact
rather than a necessary one. Using sentience as a minimally sufficient quality for
moral consideration is a method that has been used at least since Jeremy Bentham’s
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). It is in this work
that he famously intones, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?” Although this quote has been all but worshipped by modern
The definition of suffering is not without its controversies, but there is no space here for
that discussion. (See Nay & Fetherstonhaugh 2012 and Hall 1989 for example)
16
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animal rights groups, Bentham was not against the use of animals for food (if they
were killed painlessly), or against the use of animals in experiments (even if they
suffered). In other words, he did not believe that suffering was an absolute wrong to
be avoided at all costs, but rather a negative motivation to action that must be
considered, even if animal suffering for human benefit is justified.
Peter Singer’s account of the role of sentience is more nuanced. Singer sees
sentience, or “[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoyment” as ‘”the only defensible
boundary of concern for the interests of others” because all and only sentient beings
have interests of the morally relevant sort. (1989) For Singer, only sentient beings
have interests, where ‘interest’ is minimally understood as being demonstrated by
acting to avoid pain.17 (Singer, 1993) And having interests is required for moral
consideration. For Singer, though, interests come in degrees, and stronger interests
are to given greater weight than weaker ones. For example, a human’s interest in
having sufficient shelter is considered weightier than his interest in having a Ferrari.
Interests are to be considered in terms of their strength, and not in terms of the
particular individual who possesses them. In particular, Singer considers species
membership irrelevant to solving moral quandaries. Thus, a goat’s interest in
sufficient shelter is also more important than a human’s desire for a nicer car.
Importantly, Singer does not view sentient beings as equal. He believes that
interests are the moral bottom line, and that certain beings have the capacity for a
wider variety of interests than other beings. For example, a human has a wider
variety of interests, than say, a dog. A human can conceive of and have preferences
17

I think there is some work to be done in explaining the relationship between sentience
and the ability to have interests that Singer takes for granted. (See Irvin 2004)
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regarding the future of her life, of her family, of her career, etc., while a dog may only
have interests rooted in the present. Specifically, he believes that only beings with a
sense of temporal self are able to have the interest in continuing to live. (Singer
1975, p. 20-21) In a situation where all other interests are equal then, we should kill
the dog rather than the human because only the human has the explicit interest in
living.18 In this way, we can resolve moral dilemmas even while incorporating the
interests of other animals. Note, in the example case of dog versus human, we are
not ignoring the dog’s interests, nor are we claiming that an ability to conceive of the
future is required for moral consideration. In fact, Singer says, “as long as sentient
beings are conscious, they have an interest in experiencing as much pleasure and as
little pain as possible.” (1993 p. 131)
Let us compare this to Tom Regan’s view. Regan has a set of criteria which he
believes make a being worthy of moral consideration, and he calls such beings
subjects-of-a-life. Many of these criteria sound merely like variations of sentience
(such as having desires and feelings), but they also include “having a sense of the
future, including their own future.” (Regan, 1983 p.243) This will obviously exclude
many sentient animals. It may be, for instance, that conceiving of the future requires
the higher cognitive abilities found only in animals with neocorteces. In this case, all

Singer, and most people who argue that humans have a higher capacity for suffering due
to higher cognitive abilities, use this fact to argue that humans should receive preferential
treatment in situations where the physical level of suffering is apt to be equal. I find this
curious since those same cognitive capacities also give humans the ability to suffer less. For
an easy example, consider a human and a dog getting a shot. The human can say to things to
himself like “this will only last five minutes” or “this is good for me” which can temper the
suffering felt. A dog has no such recourse and may genuinely think his life in danger though
the physical experience is similar. Even in more extreme cases, such as starvation, higher
cognitive abilities allow us to disassociate and put “mind over matter”.
18
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non-mammals will lack such an ability. I don’t think this criterion is useful in
delineating moral patients, therefore, because it is too restrictive. But it may be that
this notion is a good approach for hashing out personhood in a more even-handed
way than the law currently allows. (We will discuss personhood in detail in Chapter
Four.)
Martha Nussbaum also assumes the sentience threshold in her work, even
though she considers other traits as well. Her capabilities approach treats each
individual according to his own capacity to experience, and considers what it would
mean for each one to flourish. In other words, the capabilities approach “concerns
the dignity of a form of life that possesses both deep needs and abilities; [and] its
basic goal is to address the need for a rich plurality of life activities.” (Francione &
Garner 2010, p. 305) Sentience comes into play when she is considering which
animals are subject to this kind of attention. In answer, she says, “it seems plausible
to consider sentience a threshold condition for membership in the community of
beings who have entitlements based on justice.” (Animal Rights p. 309) Thus, we are
only to be concerned with flourishing in the cases where lack of flourishing can be
experienced as negative.
Elizabeth Anderson (1993) distinguished between three groups: animal
welfarists, animal rights supporters, and environmental ethicists, claiming that they
each have a different threshold for moral considerability. She says these are
sentience, subjecthood, and being a system of life, respectively. (AR p. 278) We are
not concerned with the latter here, but note that even those with more advanced
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criteria, such as Regan, also include sentience as one requirement. So a highly
intelligent robot who could not suffer would be excluded from these systems.
Joel Feinberg is another important thinker who identifies pain as the central
criterion for identifying moral action. He uses the same vague distinction that I will
employ (and hopefully explain to the reader’s satisfaction) of “unnecessary
suffering”. He says, “If we define ‘cruel treatment’ as behavior that inflicts
unnecessary pain or torment on a creature capable of suffering—that is, pain for
which there is no good or sufficient reason—then I should think everyone would
agree that cruel treatment (so defined) always violates the rights of the being so
treated…” Not only is causing unnecessary suffering a breach of rights, but further,
“those rights rest on no ‘condition’ but the capacity to suffer and cannot ever be
justifiably withdrawn or nullified.” (Feinberg 1978)
Jeff McMahan (2002) also maintains that all sentient beings have some degree
of moral status. He says, “[T]he hypothetical sentient creature [whose] mind is so
simple that it altogether lacks either synchronic or diachronic psychological unity…
it seems wrong to suppose that the sequence of the creature’s mental states cannot
matter at all. It matters impersonally whether, for example, the creature’s
experiences are pleasurable or painful.” (p. 475-6)
The above are only a sample of the wide variety of thinkers who argue the
moral import of sentience. What I have not done here is to elaborate on those who
disagree. That is, there are many who believe that the suffering only matters if it is
accompanied by such abilities as holding beliefs to be true or false, (e.g. Frey 1983,
though he has since changed his mind) or being able to enter into a moral contract
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and demonstrate “moral autonomy” (e.g. Carruthers 1992). Others believe that
agency, not sentience, are the relevant threshold (e.g. Kagan 2019) or see autonomy
as primary (as many writers within the Kantian tradition hold). This gap reveals the
audience for whom I’m writing: those who take it as a given that causing certain
kinds of suffering are wrong, regardless of what other abilities the subject may or
may not possess. I see this as a given, and therefore take it as a starting point.19

III. Defending Against Criticisms of Sentiocentrism
We can take note that there are different sorts of sentiocentrism. One distinction
we can make, for example, would be between strong and weak sentiocentrism
(focusing solely on the interests/experiences of sentient beings vs. including
aesthetic and intellectual values, etc.). However, since this is not a treatise on the
theory itself, I will aim to keep the discussion of criticisms relatively general. Below
are two of the more common attacks on sentiocentrism.20

A. Sentiocentrism does not object to painless killing
This criticism is pretty easy to understand. If our ethic is primarily concerned
with pain and suffering, then killing a being in a way that does not cause pain or
Those interested in more detail regarding different thresholds philosophers have used, as
well as those who argue against animal rights and even welfare, may refer to DeGrazia’s
1996 book, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental life and moral status.
20 There is a third area of concern from the realm of environmentalism that bears
mentioning. Environmentalists often object to a sentience-based ethic for one of two
reasons: either it is too narrow because it excludes things as rivers, trees, and whole
ecosystems, or it entails anti-environmental outcomes in that it would ethically require us to
meddle in nature in the wrong ways. (Jamieson 2008; Sapontzis 1992) The response to both
of these is that assigning more value to sentient beings does not preclude assigning value to
others as well.
19

44

suffering does not violate that ethic. On this view, the continued killing of welltreated animals in various industries such as factory farms and research
laboratories would be acceptable insofar as the animals do not suffer in dying.
I take it that there are three ways one can respond to such a challenge. The
first is to accept the outcome, bite the bullet, so to speak. For those who are
primarily concerned with the physical suffering and not with other notions such as
dignity and autonomy, a version of the food industry that kills animals painlessly
may be acceptable. However, this would also entail accepting that killing (at least
certain) humans painlessly is also all right, a conclusion that would make many
uncomfortable. The second is to present an alternative view on what makes killing
wrong. There are multiple views available, for instance, the idea that killing is wrong
because it causes loss of consciousness (McMahan 2002), or Walter SinnottArmstrong and Frank Miller's view that killing is wrong because it causes an
individual to be completely, irreversibly disabled. (DeGrazia 2013) These are not
without their problems, however they give us an avenue forward to avoid the
unsavory conclusion above. So suffering is not necessarily a requirement of
wrongful killing. The third is to deny strong sentiocentrism. Weak sentiocentrism
makes sentience a sufficient marker for moral consideration. It does not, however,
require that all other values are expunged in the process. For example, we may view
using animals for human purposes as infringing on their dignity. Then the additional
value of maintaining dignity for those that have it is itself an injunction against
killing those beings needlessly. So long as we accept a plurality of values, of which
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avoiding unnecessary pain is only one, it is perfectly consistent to be a sentiocentrist
who takes issue with killing animals painlessly.
This type of response can also be used against a related objection to
sentiocentrism, namely that uses of animals which do not cause pain are acceptable.
This may be said about certain animals in certain zoos and aquariums or some
animals in the movie and TV industries. But again, if we include other values in our
system, the lack of pain may not be our only concern.

B. Sentiocentrism Entails Unreasonable Positive Obligations
Whatever ethic we choose to adhere to, certain obligations will follow. If one
follows sentiocentrism, it appears that the primary obligation will be to minimize
suffering and pain wherever they occur in whichever ways we can. Part of this may
be accomplished through negative obligations such as the obligations to not fight
dogs, not eat meat, not destroy habitats, etc. However, minimizing suffering may also
involve positive obligations, such as actively helping injured animals, freeing captive
animals, and restoring compromised habitats.21 The concern is that positive
obligations of this kind can be problematic. First, they may require too much of us. If
you are morally required to save every animal that you can, your life would be
overtaken by this task alone. Second, helping every suffering animal or preventing
every animal from suffering would invariably cause more suffering. We cannot
protect every prey animal without harming predatory animals. Likewise, were we to

Alastair Norcross has stated that his guiding principle is that “we are morally obligated to
eliminate all unnecessary suffering.” (2011) Such a view may lead to precisely the
consequences criticized here.
21
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protect every deer over the winter, come spring there would be an overpopulation
which could not be supported by the land, leading many to starve.
Regarding the first issue, it is common among deontological thinkers (from
Kant to Korsgaard to Scanlon) to believe that negative obligations are stronger or
more primary than positive obligations. (Kant called them perfect and imperfect
duties, respectively.) Likewise, the constitutions of many democratic countries
guarantee negative rights but not necessarily positive rights. For instance, you may
be morally (and legally) required not to stab someone, but you are not similarly
required to save a stab victim. One reason is that positive obligations generally
require more of us than negative ones. (This is not universally true, of course, but
seems to be generally accurate.)
Regarding the second issue, it is again possible, perhaps advisable, to have an
ethic with a plurality of values. Taking the predator/prey concern as an example,
lessening suffering may only be one axis of our decision making process. Another
may be to interfere as little as possible with wild animals’ lives, instead focusing on
preserving wilderness and biodiversity. As Holmes Rolston III put it, “The strong
ethical role is this: Do not cause inordinate suffering, beyond those orders of nature
from which the animals were taken…. Going further can be commended but not
required… we have no obligation to reduce suffering below levels found
independently of human presence.” (Rolston 1989, 60-61). If we accept a multivalue framework, we can suitably restrict the scope of our obligations such that
positive obligations do not exert an undue amount of pressure on our actions.
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Neither of the above subsections is meant to be a full-scale defense of
sentiocentrism, as that would involve a much longer piece of writing and a more
comprehensive discussion of the ethical issues involved in killing and obligation. But
perhaps the above sketch is enough to indicate that there are responses to the main
criticisms that come up in the literature, the strongest of which may be to take
avoiding or minimizing suffering as one motivating principle of action among many.
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Chapter 3: Problematic Paradigms – Current Proposals for
Addressing Animal Protections
The distinction between personhood and property has become muddled in
U.S. law (as will be highlighted in Chapter Four). Unfortunately, the philosophical
realm is not necessarily any clearer. This result is not surprising when we consider
that many of the more well-known animal ethics scholars accept the current legal
system’s dichotomy between personhood and property in formulating their
theories, although some have moved beyond it. The two main traditional positions
ethicists have taken regarding animal treatment are animal welfarists and animal
rights activists, who loosely represent keeping animals as property and reassigning
them to personhood, respectively. This distinction is overly simplistic, as there has
been a diversification of views in the past decade or so. Even so, conceiving of the
issue in this way is useful toward understanding the ways in which the discussion
had been and is still deeply flawed.
I will begin this chapter by discussing some of the plurality of views of
contemporary animal ethicists. In recent years this field has diversified
considerably, and although it won't be possible to mention every relevant thinker,
this sampling should provide the reader with a useful transection of the current
literature. Each view will have its own strengths and weaknesses, and, as I have
come to understand them, each falls short of providing an adequate approach to
resolving the "animal question." In providing either too much or too little for
sentient nonhumans, they fail to provide a satisfactory solution to incorporating
them into our legal and social frameworks. The criticisms made here will inform
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Chapter Five, where I will propose a new legal category which would not only find a
middle ground between legal persons and property, but also philosophically
between these views.
I. An Animal Welfare View -- Robert Garner
The purpose of welfarist philosophy is to strengthen animal welfare laws and
increase their enforcement. A welfarist examines the conditions that animals are
kept in, and thinks that the protections they are afforded are insufficient at best, or
egregious at worst. What is common to the views under the umbrella title of
“welfarist” is that they each have the goal of improving the conditions of the animals
in our care, although they vary considerably on how much to change and what sorts
of changes are required. Furthermore, they do not necessarily object to the
designation of animals as property, but only to the mistreatment of property that
happens to be capable of suffering. In particular, it is common belief that we can still
use animals primarily for our benefit as long as we treat them humanely in the
process.
Proponents of animal welfarism usually hold that giving animals rights is
anywhere from unnecessary to impractical to preposterous. For instance, Richard A.
Posner, an animal welfarist, intones, “One way to protect animals is to make them
property, because people tend to protect what they own.” (Posner 2004, p.59) We
have seen that there are laws in the U.S. that protect animals, and some of those
laws appear to distinguish animals from other forms of property. The welfarist
position can therefore take at least three forms. One form states that the laws we
have are sufficient, but the enforcement of them is lacking. Another version argues
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that the laws we have would be sufficient, if only they didn’t exclude whole
categories of animals such as farm animals, poultry, mice, rats, and non-mammals. A
stronger animal welfarist position asserts that our laws should prevent all
unnecessary suffering of animals under our care and control. Some of these are
more compatible with particular animal rights views than others.
The welfarist I will discuss in detail is Robert Garner. Garner calls his form of
welfarism “protectionism,” a position he defines as supporting “any measures that
lead to the protection of animal interests, whether they be labeled animal welfare or
animal right.” (Francione & Garner 2010, p. 104) This is distinguished from
traditional welfare views in that it is not opposed to animal rights. (Francione
identifies and criticizes this type of position, although he calls it “new welfarism.”)
Garner believes that protectionism is the correct position because it accepts the
aspirations of the animal rights movements while following what he sees as a more
practical route. In particular, he believes in the positive effects of incrementalism
and taking political and cultural realities, what he calls the “dominant narrative,” (p.
168) into account rather than focusing solely on the conclusions of moral
philosophy. Much of his writing focuses on defending his position against attacks
from other views, such as animal abolitionism. My aim here is not to rehearse that
exchange, but to examine the merits and detriments of his position in terms of what
it does and doesn’t accomplish in giving various animals the moral and legal
considerations they deserve. There are three areas of Garner’s philosophy that I
would like to discuss, namely his views on unnecessary suffering, property and
personhood, and practical measures.
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Garner defines unnecessary suffering to be any instance where “the level of
suffering inflicted on an animal outweighs the benefits likely to be gained by
humans.” (107) Therefore, unnecessary suffering designates a relationship with
human needs and welfare. In other words, “unnecessary” applies equally to the
animals and to the humans involved. Animal suffering is necessary when there are
significant human interests at stake, and where the means of satisfying those
interests cannot be achieved without it.
Garner observes, mostly correctly, that most animal welfare advocates focus
more on limiting or eliminating unnecessary animal suffering than on the right to
life and liberty. This is because there is a general consensus that many animals feel
pain, whereas there is not a consensus that many, or any, nonhuman animals
understand concepts such as life and liberty, and could therefore share those values.
(107) For example, Peter Singer believes that only those with an explicit interest in
the future can be harmed by removing that future. (Singer 1990) Likewise, many
think that only those with an explicit interest in liberty can be harmed by taking
away that liberty. These claims often rest on the distinction between intrinsic and
instrumental value, or direct and indirect interest. A cat may have an indirect
interest in the freedom from being caged, not because he finds freedom intrinsically
valuable, but because the limitations of the cage prevent him from fulfilling his
direct interests, such as playing with a toy on the other side of the room. Humans, on
the other hand, are said to value freedom and life intrinsically. (Cochrane 2009)
Singer does not engage in this debate, but merely states it to be the general
concurrence. Therefore, since we are confident that necessary suffering happens,
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but not that other animals directly value life and liberty, the former is what we
should focus on.
Although I don’t agree that animals have no intrinsic interest in life and
liberty, that issue is irrelevant here. I do agree that the capacity for suffering is what
matters, and that is a category that includes more animals than those who value
freedom. I also agree that we cannot eliminate all suffering, but that much of what
animals experience at human hands is unnecessary. (Refer to Chapter Two for
related criticisms against sentiocentrism.) Some forms of unnecessary suffering are
obvious, such as that caused by factory farms. But there are many gray areas,
including animal experimentation on fatal illnesses, which will be discussed
somewhat more fully in the last chapter. I say “somewhat” because providing a
precise definition of “unnecessary” is not an aim of the current project, although I
will paint some broad strokes.
Next Garner discusses the status of animals as property. Early on, he
dismisses the concept of personhood as useful because putting some animals in the
category of person would leave the vast majority of animals behind. Rather, we
should examine sentient animals in terms of their interests. He argues that “if we
accept that animals have a right not to suffer rather than a right to life and liberty…
the equality between humans and animals can be consistent with ownership if we
adopt the principle that we should treat the interests of animals equally with those
of humans.” (128) That is, the right to life and liberty is presumably something that
only persons have. Beings without them can be considered property, which is not,
by itself, a bad thing as far as he concerned.
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He discusses two aspects of what it means to be property, possession and
use. About possession he says, “What we have to decide is whether ownership runs
contrary to the interests of animals.” He does believe that for many animals,
including apes and wild animals, that ownership may infringe on animals’ interests,
but that this isn’t that case with all animals. Regarding use, as long as the way in
which the animal is used does not cause it suffering or death, and as long as the
animal is not autonomous, there is nothing wrong with using the animal for our
benefit. He defines “autonomy” as animals “having an interest in developing and
pursuing their own life plans.” (129) So, any animals that do have autonomy should
not be used in ways that interfere with it. Therefore, some, but not all, animals are
harmed by the designation of being property. He sees no issue with keeping those
who are not so harmed in the category.
Although I disagree with the assumption that animals do not value life and
autonomy, let’s put that aside. I also don’t agree that we should so quickly disregard
the concept of personhood altogether, as we may decide that some animals are
deserving of the considerations given to that group. But that is also a side-note. My
main dispute with Garner’s analysis is that he seems to be redefining the concept of
property to fit his argument. Property, by definition, does not have rights. To have
rights in today’s legal system is to be a legal person. All persons have rights, and all
rights-holders are persons. If we were to redefine property to allow some subcategories to have rights, I’m not sure why, in this hypothetical world, we couldn’t
put humans into the property category as well, simply as a class of property with
more rights than other classes. That is, if we are going to eliminate the fundamental
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distinction between those two categories, why not just eliminate the second
category in toto? His solution seems to eliminate the only relevant distinction we
have in the legal system now. My solution, outlined in Chapter Five, will not
eliminate a category, but add one. My hope is that such an addition elucidates,
rather than obfuscates, the difference between different types of beings.
Garner makes a claim later on regarding keeping sentient animals as a form
of property which I think points precisely to a common misconception with regards
to legal categories. He says, “[W]elfare statutes are sometimes weak and enforced
ineffectively, although this is not primarily because animals are regarded as
property.” (133) I couldn’t disagree more. The person/property division is,
unquestioningly, a higher/lower distinction as well. The very fact that sentient
beings are in the same category as inanimate objects says a lot about our national
psyche and where our priorities lay. It is a social construct that devalues an entire
group for economic benefit. David Nibert, in his book Animal Rights, Human Rights
discusses the importance of social and political structures in shaping a culture’s
system of values. In particular, he argues that prejudice is not the cause of these
structures, but becomes widespread because of them. Eventually, such views
become “naturalized,” so commonplace as to be an invisible premise in our daily
lives and actions. (2002) So it is very much the case that animals’ status as property
affects the seriousness with which we treat laws protecting them.
Garner has a pretty bleak (he would say practical) view of how we should try
to implement animal protection laws. He quotes John Gray (1997) as pointing out
that “[P]ublic policy is formed and implemented by human beings. No measure that
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does not promise a benefit to human is likely to gain a hearing.” (as quoted on p.
126) He uses this idea to argue that we should focus on animal reforms which have
tangible benefits to humans, that “associat[e] animal protection with human
interests.” (156) Such a view rests on at least two assumptions, 1. That none of the
animal welfare laws we currently have is altruistic, and 2. That there will not likely
be such laws. Both of these are suspect. First, if we consider U.S. welfare laws in
detail (as I do with some of them in Chapter Four), it is not immediately obvious that
his first assumption is true; neither is it obviously false. But the second claim is
demonstrably false when we consider some laws that other countries have passed.
For example, Britain’s law prohibiting veal crates does not appear to have positive
economic ramifications for veal farmers, nor does it improve the “quality” of the
meat as having more room to move actually makes the meat tougher. Rather, it is
designed to prevent certain kinds of suffering at a cost to both the consumer and the
producer. Second, although it may be true currently that it is difficult to pass laws
that do not benefit humans, it is the intent of animal activists to change precisely
that. Because things are a certain way does not demonstrate that they are unlikely to
change. And as noted, things are already changing, albeit in other countries.
For these reasons, I believe the leading animal welfare position to be
untenable. Animal rights views have been the historical alternative.
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II. Animal Rights Views
A. Steven Wise
Animal rights activists have as their modern-day leader Steven Wise, an
animal law scholar and lawyer currently petitioning for New York City to recognize
four chimpanzees as persons.22 He and his team are appealing a petition that was
denied to act on a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of two of the chimps. Habeas
corpus is a writ that requires a government to bring a person under arrest to be
brought before a neutral judge to determine whether there are lawful grounds for
their detention. (Center for Constitutional Rights 2019) In other words, a person
cannot be unlawfully detained. Although this only applies to legal persons, Wise
bases his argument on the fact that chimpanzees are autonomous creatures who are
as cognitively capable as two or three year old humans, and more cognitively
sophisticated than younger humans and those with severe mental handicaps. He
defines autonomy as including “desires, intentions, and a sense of self resembling
ours.” (Wise, 2004, p. 34) When one of his petitions was denied, he collected written
affidavits from animal experts that argue that chimps “routinely shoulder duties and
responsibilities both in chimpanzee communities and in human/chimpanzee
communities.” (Choplin, 2016)
Wise takes these abilities to be a clear indication that chimpanzees should be
considered persons for two reasons: 1. If so-called marginal cases of humans
deserve rights, so do chimpanzees, and 2. Chimpanzees deserve rights because of
who they are, without comparison to anyone else. That is, on one hand the legal
He actually believes that many species should be considered persons including all species
of ape, cetacean, and elephant.
22
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system is inconsistent. It denies rights to cognitively advanced nonhumans such as
apes, while according rights to humans with lesser capacities purely based on
species membership. This is an accusation of speciesism, which has been most
famously explicated by Peter Singer. On the other hand, Wise holds that any
creature with such abilities deserves rights, regardless of the values a given legal
system or society employs. That is, it would be wrong to deny chimps rights even if
humans were also denied rights.
I am inclined to agree with Wise that certain animals do display the
necessary abilities to be considered philosophical or legal persons, and that some
animals will fit almost any non-speciesist definition of personhood, of which there
are many. So this is not a point of contention. Identifying exactly which animals fall
into each category is not my goal, rather, I wish to demonstrate that our current
two-category system is insufficient. Including more animals in the “person” category
will not address that.
Wise does have a version of a multi-level system though. Even though he
believes chimpanzees should be “full-blown persons,” he does not believe that
personhood is an all-or-nothing designation; ”Personhood and basic liberty rights
should be given in proportion to the degree that one has practical autonomy. If you
have it, you get rights in full. But if you don't, the degree to which you approach it
might make you eligible to receive some proportion of liberty rights.” (Wise, 2004, p.
39) My criticism with this point of view is more practical than substantial. While it
makes an intuitive sort of sense to award rights in various degrees, I do not think
today’s legal system will accommodate such an open-ended process. The logical
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conclusion of such a view would require each species to be analyzed under its own
rubric and to receive a unique set of rights. In fact, the ultimate accommodation of
such a method might require each individual to be given rights accordingly.
Likewise, some of the difficulties already present in my current proposal,
would be magnified considerably. One such issue is the question of who would
decide which animals belong to each category. This will be a task for knowledgeable
committees, and may well take many years to resolve. Asking the legislature to
codify a sliding scale is several steps further down that road, and would likely be
met with considerable resistance. So while individualized treatment may ultimately
be the fairest method of rights allocation, it is also a legislative nightmare.
In addition, I do not think that any nonhuman animal will be accorded the
status of person anytime soon. Animals have only been property in this country.
Despite recent advances in public knowledge of the conditions in which animals are
kept, there seems to be little public support for such a radical move. (More will be
said about this in Chapter Four.) To call other animals “persons,” even if that
designation is understood to be only partial, will imply that they are equivalent to
humans in important ways, and this is not something that most citizens will readily
accept. We have seen that people are often ready to admit that animals suffer, but
they are not ready to acknowledge higher cognitive abilities in certain animals and
therefore to accept the changes in treatment such knowledge would entail. This is
despite the fact that many animals do share the advanced abilities that most people
take to be indicative of higher moral status. A focus on cognitive abilities is to fight
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an uphill battle. A focus on suffering would meet the majority of the population
where they already are.
A further problem I have with Wise’s account is that there are many species
of animal that belong to a vast grey area. Wise addresses this to some extent when
he says that those animals with a 0.7 probability of possessing autonomy would be
“presumed to have practical autonomy sufficient for basic liberty rights.” (Wise
2004, p. 37) He views this as an extension of the “precautionary principle” which
states that if an action or policy is suspected to be harmful, “in the absence of
scientific consensus that the action or policy is not harmful, the burden of proof that
it is not harmful falls on those taking an action.” (Wikipedia 2011) This is
instantiated, for example, in the U.S. Endangered Species Act (discussed in more
detail later), and Wise would like to apply it to animals who are probably
autonomous. In other words, better safe than sorry. As a theoretical point, there is
little reason to disagree with Wise on his approach, even if one might disagree about
the threshold he chooses. But even so, there is glaring omission in this sort of
thinking: He does not address the large number of species that can clearly suffer, but
would fall well short of personhood, and thus short of deserving rights on Wise’s
account. Of them, he says nothing.
I focused on Wise first because of his prominence and his clear stance on the
issues. But there are others on the side of animal rights who are in a similarly
insufficient boat, Gary Francione for one. How he and other thinkers differ primarily
is in terms of which qualifications they take as conferring rights on an animal, and
what those rights would require of humans.
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B. Gary Francione
Francione believes that certain animals (those with at least some interests)
should be considered persons, and that this acknowledgement requires us to stop
using them in any way that treats them as “merely resources.” (Francione 2015)
Because we would have to stop these uses in their entirety his view is often called
“abolitionism.” Francione’s endgame is two-fold: 1. “[T]o abolish the
institutionalized exploitation of animal subjects-of-a-life” which entails the
“eradication of the property status of nonhumans.” The uses of animals for food,
biomedical experiments, entertainment, clothing, and companions all fall under this
umbrella. 2. “[I]n seeking this long-term goal, the rights advocate cannot endorse
the sacrifice of fundamental interests of some animals today…” (Francione 2007
p.190) He believes that incrementally introducing prohibitions (small-scale
abolitions) is an acceptable course, as long as this second criterion is not violated.
The set of examples he uses to clarify the distinction is the difference between
decreasing the number of hens that can be kept in a battery cage from 4 to 3, and
eradicating battery cages completely. The former is a change of degree, while the
latter is a change of kind. Incremental changes, which do not constitute a change in
the kind of activity allowed, are not in line with his view of the rights theory, for that
would be tantamount to endorsing another form of exploitation. Regarding the first
criterion, prohibitions must result in a state-of-affairs that is consistent with the
status of animals as inherently valuable.
Francione views these prohibitions as recognizing the inherent value in
nonhuman animals, and thereby incrementally assembling a notion of nonhuman
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personhood. For him, persons are beings with inherent value, and therefore cannot
be treated merely as resources. As for what characteristics one needs to be
considered a person, he says, “No characteristic other than sentience is required for
personhood.” (2006) He particularly rejects the “similar-minds theory” which
requires animals to have at least some humanlike cognitive abilities, and in doing so
disagrees with Regan’s Right View, discussed below.
The problems with his view are many. First let’s touch on the concept of
abolitionism in general. His argument can be summarized as follows:
P1 It is wrong to treat animals as mere resources.
P2 All of our uses of animals treat them as mere resources.
C We should end all uses of animals.
I will not discuss P1 here because the obvious falsity of P2 negates the argument. Not
all uses are abuses. In particular, if we think about companion animals, the majority
of which are not mistreated in any significant or systematic way, we have an entire
category of animals that Francione thinks should be abolished (by grandfathering
them out). I would not deny that we treat pets as resources, but most of us do not
treat them as mere resources. Studies have shown quite the opposite. Most
observations make it clear that pets are viewed as having a similar place in many
humans’ lives as other humans do. In other words, they are often viewed as having
intrinsic value. This second premise of Francione’s seems so misguided that one
might worry this isn’t his intended point, but I can find no evidence to the contrary.
His next argument is that accepting incrementalism will stifle greater,
categorical change in the future. Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence to
support this, nor was I able to uncover any. In fact, incremental changes bring
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people on board with reforming animal treatment who would not, at that time, be
willing or able to make greater changes. For instance, if the only two choices of diet
were omnivore and vegan, many vegetarians would not have stopped eating meat,
myself included. If we argue that we need to abolish chickens as food, many people
will turn away without giving the idea a second thought. If, on the other hand, we
say, wouldn’t it be great if chickens raised for food were treated better, people will
generally agree. Planting the seeds of compassion is a worthy goal. We are creatures
of habit, and as such, need time to adjust to changes. Not only does incrementalism
fit human nature, it also is how the law works. The law changes abruptly only on
rare occasion. Most changes happen piecemeal and over many years. Having any law
that helps animals for their own sakes on the books means that such principles are
valuable to us. Such “gateway laws” indicate that, as a species, we are willing and
able to open up the sphere of moral considerability. Once that barrier has been
broken, there is room for further improvement.
Francione is also working within a traditional animal rights theory
framework which, according to Donaldson and Kymlicka, has two related core flaws:
It focuses on negative obligations instead of also incorporating positive and
relational ones, and it assumes that animal-human relationships are inherently
exploitative and that animals should be let to live independently. (2011) Negative
obligations will never be capable of capturing the full range of ways in which we
interact with animals or allow any meaningful prescriptions for how inclusive
human-animal communities can be formed. My proposal, on the other hand,
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includes both negative and positive obligations (though I don’t enumerate relational
obligations here) as well as assumes the existence of human-animal communities.
The last issue with Francione’s view that I’d like to discuss is his conflation of
the concepts of personhood and sentience. To say that all sentient animals should be
considered persons is to negate the important distinctions that personhood entails.
There are many definitions available from both legal and philosophical perspectives,
but a common theme among them is that personhood designates certain cognitively
advanced characteristics. (A sampling of such definitions is presented in Chapter
Four.) My project’s focus on the importance of sentience does not come with a
denial of the importance of personhood. It is only that personhood is currently taken
as the sole characteristic by which entities gain legal rights, and that seems too
narrow. To conflate the two categories is to miss the point entirely. For the time
being, I’m perfectly happy to leave personhood alone, both in terms of whom it
describes and what it confers. At the same time, we need to raise up sentience as
another designation, one which also confers significant legal consideration.

III. Other Paradigms
A. Shelly Kagan
Another recent account comes from Shelly Kagan’s book How to Count
Animals. (2019) He argues that the correct way to incorporate animals into our
moral system is through a hierarchy, where humans are (usually) at the top, and
nonhuman animals cascade down in the way one might expect (mammals above
birds, birds above reptiles, etc.) until one reaches animals with no moral standing,
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such as, he thinks, insects. He believes that agency and sentience are what give
beings moral standing because those determine how much good a life may have, and
that these things can come in degrees which correspond to their relative moral
status. Agency and sentience are the important characteristics, because they allow a
being’s life to matter to it. The more welfare or good a life can achieve, the more a
life matters, which makes that life more valuable, and therefore raises that being’s
status. (I’m paraphrasing, but not, I think, inaccurately.)
He believes that deontology is a good framework to accommodate this
methodology (for reasons I won’t go into), and that the most practical way of
instantiating such a system would be through a step-function, where there are a
certain number of statuses (he says not more than 6), and all beings can be matched
with the status that is appropriate for them. For example, persons (whether human
or not) would have full moral status, and plants would presumably have no status.
There is one aspect of his theory that I find both intuitive and attractive: the
step-function. As I mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, the logical extension of
Wise’s view would require us to individually evaluate each being to identify her
level of autonomy. This is both unpractical and unnecessary when accurate
generalizations about a species are available. Surely, there may be some individuals
who are more or less advanced than their typical conspecific, but those instances
could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as they are with humans (when a court
finds someone legally incompetent, for example). So instead, we can have several
categories, and divide living beings up among them, knowing that every species
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within a particular level will not be identical in terms of whichever abilities we find
morally relevant (some may have more agency or sentience than others).
Kagan vaguely gestures at there having to be thresholds dividing the levels,
though he never makes an attempt to specify what they might be. My own legal
proposal will follow the broad strokes of his suggestion in that I will suggest three
“status levels” though I won’t call them that (the word “status” is uncomfortable in
this context). But I will go further than Kagan in suggesting the boundaries between
them should be personhood (for comprehensive rights) and sentience without
personhood (for a subset of those rights).
Despite this happy agreement, there are some core elements of his thought
that are problematic. First, he places a lot of emphasis on agency. In fact, he believes
agency to be more important than sentience. He supports this partly with general
claims about being able to imagine agency without sentience. That’s fine; artificial
intelligence may well develop into something like that. However, the other part of
his assumption is that a non-sentient agent could be harmed by having its agency
thwarted. This struck me as a curious claim, since I can’t see why agency would
matter to a non-sentient being. What kind of harm could he be talking about?
Although he doesn’t make this clear until near the end of the book, Kagan eventually
explains that his version of sentience only includes physical pain and pleasure. By
contrast, when I use the term “sentience,” I am including all forms of suffering and
pleasure, including psychological forms. So to suggest that agency matters because it
causes psychological suffering is, to my mind, just another way of saying that
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sentience matters. So his focus on agency appears to unnecessarily complicate the
discussion rather than illuminate it. We can just talk about sentience.
I alluded earlier to his focus on status. This is another aspect of Kagan’s
theory that gives me pause. In giving an account of a moral theory, he believes that a
moral hierarchy is required. First, he seems to ignore that moral considerability is
only one way to matter. Developing a system of how much or little to consider
others in our moral theory should not be confused with an all-encompassing
hierarchy which is capable of determining someone’s status. On my system, the
levels are not determinative of a hierarchy. The two main theories about what laws
do are Interest Theory and Will Theory (wherein law protect one’s interests or
make one a small-scale sovereign over oneself and property, respectively). (Wenar
2015) So laws are likely either based on interests or will, not status per se.
I have several other issues with his work as a whole, such as his heavy
reliance on intuition. However, I will focus on one more problematic aspect in his
reasoning as it pertains to identifying different levels (statuses) of beings. He makes,
it seems to me, several ad hoc arguments for preserving humans, and particularly
“marginal humans,”23 as having the same status as normally developed and
functioning humans. He seems to do this out of a discomfort with a consequence of
his own system, whereby some humans (based on their level of agency) would have
the same status as some nonhuman animals.

He uses this term, which is problematic for several reasons, not least of which because it
implies that some humans are barely human. I will therefore avoid it when discussing
certain populations of humans in Chapter Six.
23
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There are at least two sections guilty of this offense. The first is 5.3 where he
discussed which psychological capacities are relevant to moral status. He says,
“What matters isn’t the kind of welfare that one can in principle achieve (given one’s
capacities), but the kind of welfare to which one can aspire.” “Aspiring” to him
includes even cases where one has “no realistic chance of attaining it ” (the
particular type of welfare or good). (122) I just don’t see why aspiring to some
psychological capacity or good counts at all toward the kinds of good that Kagan
thinks make a life more valuable. This whole idea is seemingly just a device to give
humans higher moral status so long as they can aspire to have the abilities that
confer such a status to other humans. (He has a similarly suspect discussion
regarding potential in 5.4 that I will decline to engage.)
The other ad hoc addition appears in 5.5 as a discussion of what he calls
modal status. The idea here is that if a particular human had the potential to become
a person when she was born, but then had some accident which now precludes that
development, “she could have been a person now, since she would have been a
person had the accident never happened.” (137) She is therefore a modal person,
and has a higher moral status than another being with the exact same psychological
capacities who never had personhood potential. He doesn’t really offer any
argument for this other than it avoids the uncomfortable conclusion of giving some
humans the same moral status as, say, dogs. Contrary to Kagan, I am not interested
in finding ways of forcing all humans to have a higher status than most or all other
animals. I think it is perfectly acceptable to say something (which I do later) along
the lines of: “Following our theory consistently would imply that in some cases
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humans would have the same rights as dogs. However, for practical reasons we
won’t follow the theory in all cases.” That would be more honest.
B. Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka
I’d like to conclude this section by mentioning an important piece of work in
political theory. The book Zoopolis, by Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka does very
interesting and important work in discussing the various roles that nonhuman
animals play in (what we think of as) human society. They distinguish different
groups of animals by degree of domesticity, along with what those designations
might entail morally and politically. In particular, they argue for three categories of
animal: domestic animals as citizens, liminal animals as denizens, and wild animals
as sovereigns. Citizens would have rights that allow them to exercise their agency so
long as those didn’t end up infringing unacceptably on the rest of society (such as
the right to use public spaces, the right to procreate, etc.). Their model therefore
includes different rights than mine does (see section 5.2). Animals that are neither
domesticated nor wild (like pigeons and rats who live in cities) would be designated
liminal animals and given rights as well, though less robust ones. Wild animals are
thought of as having “the ability to respond to the challenges that a community
faces, and to provide a social context in which…individual members can grow and
flourish,” (p. 175) and are therefore to be treated as autonomous and sovereign.
There are a lot of things I like about this system. For instance, they take care
to address the issue of how to include animals in a contractualist society when
animals are not widely thought of as being able to participate in contract-making.
This work intersects with work on disability rights, some of which I’ll return to in
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Chapter Six. Despite all the useful theoretical development in Zoopolis, one thing
that is lacking is an explanation of how these measures would be accomplished
legally. This is exactly what I am aiming to do. My legal paradigm and their levels of
domesticity/citizenship seem to me to be largely compatible, although I won’t fully
explore that compatibility here. I therefore see their work as adjacent, rather than in
conflict, with my own.

Given that the above systems of thought represent some of the main avenues
for thinking about how animals fall into our societal and legal structures, we need
another option. None of the above gives protections to all sentient beings that go
beyond property status while maintaining the useful distinction between persons
and nonpersons. The next chapter sketches the categories under U.S. law and their
insufficiency.
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Chapter 4: Caught in the Middle – The Gray Space between
Personhood and Property
“Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization.” (Vandevelde 1980)
U.S. law, as most law, is founded on making distinctions. The central
distinction being discussed in this paper is the one between persons and property.
Any thing considered by the law, be it living or inanimate, is shuffled into one of
these groups. This unnatural dichotomy has confused and muddied our legal
system. It has forced things which are not property to be called “property” and
things which are not persons to be called “persons.” There are many examples of
such things: human incompetents, fetuses, and corporations, etc., and, of course,
nonhuman animals. I therefore argue that we need a third category, legal patients, to
fix this unfortunate oversight. I discuss this new category mainly in relation to
sentient nonhumans, but will suggest in Chapter Six that it can be used more
broadly. For now, I will use two groups, corporations and fetuses, to show how
being limited to these two options has led our courts to create a de facto
intermediate category by attributing to some things traits of both persons and
property. Following this, we will see that nonhuman animals often pose a particular
dilemma for some courts and judges, many of whom are of two minds on the
subject. I will use this as ammunition for my contention that a third category not
only makes sense philosophically, but would simplify and clarify the legal standing
of all those who are categorical nomads, resting for a moment here or there, but
never fully belonging.
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In doing so, I will begin by elaborating on what the legal terms “person” and
“property” mean and what each designation means for those so categorized. As we
explore the constituents of the categories, I hope the reader will see that each
contains inconsistencies and unintuitive inclusions. At the end of this chapter, I will
take a brief, comparative look at the ways in which some other countries address
the animal question specifically.

I. Criminal and Civil Law
Cases that are brought to court can be criminal or civil. Criminal acts are acts
committed against the country or state, while civil violations are acts committed
against persons or property. Criminal cases involve the breaking of law, either at the
national, state, or municipal level. Civil cases involve the failure to adhere to legal
duties to individuals, including respecting rights established under the Constitution
or federal or state law. (Find Law 2019b) This distinction is central to my argument.
Currently, there are federal and state laws regulating how certain animals may be
treated in many scenarios. Although I believe such laws to be inadequate, they exist,
and may be thought of as granting certain animals certain rights (a point discussed
in more detail below). However, on the civil side, animals are clearly considered
property and therefore have no rights. The proposal I lay out in Chapter Five is
intended to remedy this oversight, and describes how we may enact a system that
grants animals certain civil rights. The discussion that follows includes where
different legal entities stand in terms of the criminal and civil law.
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II. Persons vs. Property
According to a commonly used definition, a legal person (or legal
personality) is any entity capable of holding legal rights and obligations. (Martin
2003) The U.S. legal system recognizes several categories of being under the
umbrella of personhood. There are so-called natural persons, a term which
encompasses all living, birthed humans as well as some pre-natal humans, and
artificial or juridical persons including corporations, partnerships, and sovereign
states. (Williams v The Shipping Corporation of India) Humans acquire legal
personhood as soon as they are born (if not before); juridical persons acquire legal
personhood when they are legally incorporated.
There are different theories as to what justifies the acknowledgement of an
entity as a legal person. I won’t enter into this particular debate although I will list a
few options to acknowledge that there is room for discussion as to what exactly we
believe or want the category to mean. One theory holds that legal personalities
represent the intersection of personal (economic) interest and substantive law.
(Carnelutti 1955) This allows for collective interests which can be held by collective
or compound persons “who” are comprised of two or more individuals (i.e.
corporations, etc.). A second theory maintains that juridical persons are legal
fictions, that is, they are created (rather than identified or discovered) for the
purposes of the law. (Savigny 2009) They therefore do not have free will and are not
subject to the law. This view would grant personhood only to natural persons,
excluding compound persons from the category. Yet a third view argues that all
persons are juridical (artificial) persons insofar as the law “creates” all persons for
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specific purposes. This view identifies the unifying thread of all persons as those
whose conduct is able to express moral values. (Barker 1980) Therefore natural and
juridical persons are equally deserving of the personhood designation. These are
just a few of a large number of views of the essence of personhood. The motivation
on which our system is based is most likely closest to the first.
So the philosophical underpinnings of legal personhood are not agreed upon,
even by those who are in the best position to identify them. A brief survey of courts’
decisions in cases where inclusion in personhood was at stake would reveal a
similarly varied group of views from our nation’s judges. But perhaps this is not
surprising. After all, much of the history of our nation can be described in terms of
an ever-expanding circle of legal rights. From slaves and women to corporations and
gay humans, the limits of citizenship and personhood have developed along a
largely uninterrupted path of expansion.
The difficulties with delimiting personhood are mirrored in the question of
property. Black’s Law Dictionary states, “The ownership of a thing is the right of one
or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the
thing of which there may be ownership is called ‘property.’”24 (Civ. Code Cal.) Those
who own property have property rights defined as “The rights given to the person
or persons who have a right to own the property through purchase or bequest.
These are basic rights in any society though absolute right for a property is rare in
any society.” (Ibid)

Some theorists identify a difference between the uses of “ownership” and “possession”.
((Donahue & Alexander 2007) I make no such distinction here.
24
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Persons may possess property. In some extreme cases, those humans who
were disallowed property were not considered persons, as happened in the
institution of slavery. Although the concept of property has been part of widely used
legal systems at least since ancient Rome, it has changed a lot in that time. The
previous status of women and so-called slaves are two of the clearest cases of what
today would be considered the misuse of that designation. Today we wholeheartedly believe that human beings are not property. Or do we? I will discuss the
apparently mixed feeling we have about fetuses below.
Generally speaking, only persons can own property, and everything that is
not a person can be considered property.25 In other words, the U.S. legal system
divides the world up into these two categories; as such, they are (mostly) mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive. And within certain limits, persons have absolute
right over their property. For example, if I own a painting, I can preserve it, gift it, or
even destroy it. (Donahue & Alexander 2007) There are several categories of
property that the law recognizes, but the only one we will be discussing is tangible
personal property. What is important is that 1. Property is the only alternative
category to personhood, and 2. Both categories contain entities of vastly different
types. The next section provides brief synopses of the particular and peculiar
instances of corporations and human fetuses. I use these to demonstrate the lack of
clarity in the U.S., and as evidence of problems that arise in pigeonholing all beings
into two groups.

There are a few exceptions, such as pets being able to be the recipients of trusts.
(Dickinson 2017)
25
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III. Corporations & Fetuses as Legal Entities
Corporations are an example of juridical persons: entities which are legally
classified as persons that are not born human beings. The Bill of Rights and
subsequent amendments to the Constitution represent the core sort of right that
persons are granted, or perhaps are entitled to, under U.S. law. Natural persons are
granted these rights automatically. And while certain rights can be revoked (such as
a driver’s license or citizenship) and other rights are only conferred at a certain age
(such as voting or running for elected office), there are specific and often stringent
restrictions to the limitation of rights of natural persons. On the other hand, juridical
persons, even once incorporated, are only afforded some of the rights of natural
persons. They do not, for instance, have the second amendment right to bear arms,
the right to vote, or the right to marry. (Witt 2011) Corporations do, however, have
many of the same rights as natural persons.26 But, they are also not considered full
persons, and are often treated as property. For one, they do not have many of the
rights that natural persons do, such as the majority of the constitutional

Back in 1791, personhood was limited in the Bill of Rights to include only white, male
landowners of 21 years or more. Corporations were first given standing in the Constitution
in 1819. (Dartmouth College v. Woodward) Corporations were excluded from the rights of
citizenship and the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments in 1868 and 1873, respectively. (Paul v.
State of Virginia; Slaughterhouse Cases) Then in 1886, the Supreme Court gave corporations
inclusion in the word “person” in the 14th Amendment. (Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad) They are given further rights with their inclusion under the 5th amendment
in 1890. (Noble v. Union River Lodging) Corporations get 4th and 6th amendment rights in
1906 and 1908. (Hale v. Henkel; Armour Packing Co. v. U.S.) Corporations are granted
limited 1st amendment rights in 1936. (Grosjean v. American Press co.) In 1939, the Court
held that only individuals (i.e. natural persons and not corporations) can hold 1st
amendment rights. (Hague v. CIO) Corporations are granted the right to a trial by jury (7th
amendment) in 1970. (Ross v. Bernhard) In 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporate
funding of certain broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited, protecting
corporations’ 1st amendment rights, overturning or partially overturning several previous
decisions.
26

76

amendments. This marks a stark contrast to other historically marginalized human
groups, such as people of color, who have been acknowledged as full persons with
all the corresponding rights and privileges. Second, and quite importantly,
corporations can be owned, bought and sold, traded, broken up, and liquidated,
things that can be done with property but not natural persons.
Due to their status as persons, corporations have both criminal and civil
rights and obligations just as natural persons do. As specified in 1 U.S.C. §1, “In
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates
otherwise… the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals…” (1 U. S. Code §1) On the federal (criminal) side, corporations have
duties towards the country and state, such as paying taxes, accurate representations
of their financials, and not manipulating the stock market. If they violate these
duties, members of the company may be subject to imprisonment, fines and
community service orders. On the civil side, they have to abide by many rules which
protect their customers, such as adhering to contracts, disclosing changes in
services provided, etc. Violations of these rules are usually handled with injunctions
or monetary damages. (Coppolo & Gelb 2002; Carlson 2011) In terms of civil cases,
corporations are able to both bring a third party to court and be brought to court by
a third party. That is, they can sue and be sued by other persons. (Deputy Attorney
General 1999) Therefore, we can think of corporations of an example of entities
which can be conceived of as either persons or property, depending on the
circumstance. They exist in an undefined grey area, straddling the two realms, not
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fully captured by either.
A second contentious category of personhood is unborn humans. Fetuses are
not considered legal persons at the moment (at least at the federal level), though
there is a healthy debate around the issue. This is an interesting group to consider
because these are living human beings, even though they’re treated differently than
other humans. The central question is, at what point, if any, do fetuses qualify for the
status of person? Answers to this question vary from the point of conception, to
zygotes, embryos, fetuses, and the moment of birth. On the latter end of the
spectrum is the Supreme Court, and thus current U.S. law. “In Roe v. Wade all nine
justices agreed that the use of ‘person’ in the Constitution always assumed a born
person, and therefore that the 14th Amendment’s mention of person did not confer
constitutional rights until after a live birth. In the years since Roe, when the makeup of the court has changed, no justice has ever disagreed with that conclusion,
including those who would overturn Roe and Casey.” (Robertson 1994, p. 457)
While this is the federal law, states are free to enact legal protections, such as
homicidal laws, for embryos or fetuses, but only insofar as they do not interfere with
the federal right to an abortion within certain gestational limits.27 In other words,
fetuses are not persons, but they do possess some basic protections that are
reminiscent of those afforded to persons.

States are also able to set their own abortion restrictions beyond Roe v. Wade regarding
whether, when and how a woman may obtain an abortion. Some (Nebraska and North
Carolina) prohibit aborting fetuses as early at 20 weeks, though there are exceptions for
some extreme circumstances. (Find Law 2019a) And, of course, some states have enacted
laws which directly challenge Roe v. Wade, but those have not yet been addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. For a comprehensive list of abortion limitations be state, see
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws
27
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On the criminal law side, there are both national and state laws regulating
the rights of fetuses, though this is a relatively new development in American law.
As late as the 1940’s, wrongful death cases in general, and specifically for fetuses,
were not common in the courts. But around this time, it became seen as
unacceptable for the fetus to have no legal standing. (Shah 2001) As of 2014, thirtyeight states provided some level of criminal protection for fetuses, twenty-three of
which protect the fetus from conception to birth. (Boudreaux & Thompson Jr. 2015)
Federally, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1999 makes the injury or death to a
fetus a federal crime if it takes place while committing a federal crime against the
mother. “By attempting to enact a new statute that would endow an unborn child
with the same legal protections granted to a ‘person,’ the legislature avoided both
determining when a fetus attained personhood and construing any existing statutes
to encompass the unborn.” (Shah 2001, p.932) With criminal cases, the plaintiff is
the government whose law was violated, not any individual. Therefore, it’s really
civil law that has the ability to confer personhood, not criminal law.
Fetal protection laws in civil courts vary from state to state as well. Courts
have been divided over whether dead fetuses should be seen as people in wrongful
death cases and under what conditions such lawsuits can be brought. Many states
require that a fetus be born alive before a wrongful death suit can be brought on
their behalf. Other states allow wrongful death suits on behalf of an unborn fetus,
though some require the fetus to be viable at the time of death and other states do
not. (Robinson 2003) In addition, a majority of states allow suits to be brought on
behalf of injuries to a born child caused during pregnancy, regardless of the
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developmental stage at which the injury was inflicted. (Linton 2011) As we can see,
most states do allow a civil suit to be brought on the fetus’s behalf, although some
require the fetus to be viable at the time of injury or death. Suing in civil court
means that the family can receive financial damages from the liable party. These
damages usually include loss of consortium and lost future earnings. (Find Law
2019c)
There are some questions left unanswered by current case law. First, I could not
find any instance in which a case was brought for injury to a fetus while they were
still in the womb. What that means is, it is unclear whether an actual fetus (through
a representative, of course) is legally allowed to sue. This is not the same as when a
child born sues for an injury they sustained as a fetus, because then there is a clear
natural person who is suing. There are cases where a mother sues for injury while
still pregnant, but this appears to only be for her own injuries, not that of the fetus.
Another open question is whether damages received on behalf of the now born child
can be delimited for use only in their interest. This question is important because a
positive answer would indicate that the courts are concerned with making the child
whole, whereas a negative answer would indicate the concern was with either
making the mother whole or punishing the injuring party.
Without these assurances, fetuses are not full persons under the law. This is
despite the fact that fetuses have a myriad of rights usually associated with
personhood and increasing social pressure to resolve fetuses’ legal status. However,
fetuses are not considered property either. In 1992, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee heard the appeal of a Louisiana case which resolved that fetuses were
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“tiny persons.” (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (2000). The Court held that
frozen embryos are neither persons nor property, “but occupy an interim category
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”
(Davis v. Davis 1992) In 1998, New York Supreme Court rejected the “interim
category” approach and saying instead that embryos are a “bundle of rights” that the
biological parents hold. (Kass v. Kass 1998) These are only a couple examples of the
views and disputes that categorizing fetuses has produced.28 This debate is
primarily about whether the property framework can be applied to embryos and
fetuses in the first place.
Many believe that fetuses are correctly categorized as property, and we can
see that in some ways, the law treats them as such.29 For one, early stage fetuses
(embryos) are viewed as a valuable commodity, both as a source of potential
children, and a source for stem cells. (Berg 2005) In this context, embryos have
significant economic value and are treated much more like property than persons.
Early stage fetuses may also be viewed as an organ of one’s body, akin to a lung or
kidney. Insofar as one owns one’s body, one would also own the fetus. On this
account there are some limitations as certain things are illegal to do even with one’s
own body, such as selling vital organs. (Robertson 1994) Also, one might argue that
insofar as reproductive liberty rights (e.g. being able to choose to get an abortion)
take precedence over fetal rights, that fetuses are seen as property. This is perhaps

For a more comprehensive list of examples, see Berg 2005.
Although the question may be better described as: Are there “interests in the entity that
can and should be defined in terms of property and, thus, basic precepts of property law
applied.” (Robertson 1994, pp. 454-55; Berg 2005)
28
29
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more convincing at the early stages of development when fetal rights are either
limited or non-existent (which varies by state).
By examining the various fetal laws in the U.S., it is clear that fetuses are not
treated as belonging entirely to one category or the other. "Like animals... potential
humans dwell in a hybrid place between property and person." (Animal Law, p. 73)
In fact, our current law suggests that fetuses have both property and personhood
rights, and that these two are not always in conflict with one another. Another way
of putting this might be to say that fetuses do not really belong to either category, so
we do the best we can with the designations available to us. In this way, the question
of fetuses’ legal status mirrors some of the issues with animals’ legal status, which
will be highlighted next.

IV. The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals
In Chapter One, I outlined the main animal protection laws that the U.S.
currently has. I argued there that those laws are not as effective as they may first
appear, and further, that the motivations behind them are not very animal-centric.
In this section, I will begin by furthering this point, briefly highlighting some
important points from the history of animal law. Afterwards, I will take a somewhat
different approach, demonstrating through several judges’ rulings that we can see a
clear hesitance to agree to animals’ purely property designation. As with fetuses and
corporations, there appears to be an underlying discomfort with the
person/property ultimatum that exists in the law. Or, as Gary Francione puts it,
“[A]ttitudes about animals are hopelessly confused.” (1996) In Chapter Five I will
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explain my solution to this, but for the present it will suffice to show that there is a
problem, and one which has not gone unnoticed by our courts.

A. Legislative Motivations: How We Got Here
There are others who have written thoroughly on the history of animals as
property30, and so I will only give a few snippets here. In 1641, the Massachusetts
Bay Colony passed the first anticruelty law in North America. (Francione 1996)
Later, in 1822, Richard Martin succeeded in passing Dick Martin’s Act, “an act to
prevent the cruel and improper treatment of cattle.” (Cruel and Improper Treatment
of Cattle Act 1822) The law begins, “Whereas it is expedient to prevent the cruel and
improper Treatment of Horses, Mares, Geldings,” etc. In other words, the stated
purpose of the law was human convenience. In the first half of the nineteenth
century, the U.S. saw several cases which allowed criminal prosecution for causing
animal harm. One type of reason the courts gave for this was “malicious mischief.”
One court stated, “There is a well-defined difference between the offense of
malicious or mischievous injury to property, and that of cruelty to animals. The
former constituted an indictable offense at common law, while the latter did not.” It
went on to say that in recent years, harm to animals has been included under the
title of “mischief.” (Favre & Tsang 1993) As Favre and Tsang say, “The pain and
suffering of the animal was not as much of a legal concern during this time as was
the moral impact of the action on humans.” This point is enforced by the observation

See, for example, Steven Wise’s Unlocking the Cage and David Favre & Vivien Tsang’s The
Development of the Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 1800's.
30
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that many states at this time limited anti-cruelty laws to those with commercial
value, which excluded pets and wild animals. The goal was clearly to protect the
monetary interests of humans, not the well-being of nonhuman animals. In states
that did protect animals themselves, it was often only cruel or malicious beating that
were prohibited, not any other harmful acts. This demonstrates that while animal
welfare may have been a concern for some, it was certainly not a given, and was not
a pivotal factor in the passing of many anti-cruelty laws.
Favre & Tsang (1993) further explain this point (emphasis added):
Initially, the societal concern about cruelty to animals contained mixed motives.
While some did not believe moral duties were owed to animals, they did accept
that cruelty to animals was potentially harmful to the human actor, as it might
lead to cruel acts against humans. Thus, the concern was for the moral state of the
human actor, rather than the suffering of the nonhuman animal. This focus of
concern was reflected in the early state laws by the location of the anti-cruelty
provision within the criminal code. In many states, these provisions are found in
chapters of the criminal code entitled, "Of Offenses Against Chastity, Decency and
Morality."
The ideas contained in the 1829 Act were replicated by many state legislatures
over the following thirty years… [and] they applied to acts against not only horses
and oxen but to other animals, so long as the animals were owned by someone…
[There was] continued confusion about the intended purpose of the law: to protect
valuable personal property or to restrict the pain and suffering inflicted upon
animals.
Then in 1866 Henry Bergh started the ASPCA, which had the explicit purpose
of preventing cruelty to animals, enforcing laws, and getting violators prosecuted.
After this, the laws slowly began shifting focus away from such things as ownership
and human virtue, and toward what the animals themselves were experiencing.
Many laws expanded to include not just intentional acts, but also negligent ones.
And today, every state has laws that protect animals from “unnecessary” cruelty.
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(Francione 1996)
Besides their stated purpose, an important aspect of anti-cruelty laws is how
they define their terms. “Cruelty,” “torture,” and “torment,” are three examples of
commonly used words, and are all defined at least partly in terms of whether or not
there was justification for the harm caused to the animal(s). As it turns out, such
“justifications” are usually fairly open-ended, often including any actions which are
considered “common practice.” For example, if it is common practice to castrate
bulls without anesthesia, then, legally speaking, it’s not cruel. These and other
exemptions render anti-cruelty laws largely ineffectual.
The 1981 case, Knox v. MA Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
revolved around the interpretation of G.L. ch. 272 sec. 80 which states “No person
shall offer or give away any live animal as a prize or an award in a game, contest, or
tournament involving skill or chance.” This law sounds as if we have animals’
interests in mind, however, in its judgment, the court said that these statutes are
“directed against acts which may be thought to have a tendency to dull
humanitarian feeling and to corrupt the morals of those who observe or have
knowledge of those acts.”
Certain kinds of animal uses are illegal in the U.S. now, but things such as
bearbaiting and cockfighting “are prohibited only in part out of the compassion for
suffering animals; the main reason they were abolished was because it was felt that
they debased and brutalized the citizenry who flocked to witness such spectacles.”
(Kristol 1972) In People v. Garcia, where a man was convicted for violating the NY
anti-cruelty statute, the judge wrote, “The crime was established in recognition of
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the correlation between violence against animals and subsequent violence against
humans. Thus, it must be inferred that the Legislature’s concern was with the state
of mind of the perpetrator rather than that of the victim.” (29 A.D. 3d 255
2006) These examples represent the clearly mixed motivations that legislators have
had for passing laws to protect animals. This lack of clarity is mirrored in the mixed
feelings modern courts have about animals’ legal status.

B. Judicial Ambivalence: What are Animals and What Do They Deserve?
Judges are not all of a mind about the legal status of animals. Some judges
appear to have no qualms about relegating animals to property status. In
Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assoc. Animal Hospital (2003), a dog, Poopi, was given an
operation she didn’t need, and her owners sued for veterinary malpractice,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of companionship. In the
summary judgment, the court stated:
Plaintiffs concede that dogs are currently classified as personal property under Ohio law and
that the law does not recognize noneconomic damages for personal property. Nonetheless,
plaintiffs contend that we should “do the right thing” by distinguishing between inanimate
property like chairs and tables, and animate property like dogs, cats, birds, and other animals
who may serve as companions. Such a change in the law may one day occur, but this is not the
proper case for plowing new ground… sentimentality is not a proper element in determining
damages caused to animals.

The judgment goes on to affirm that, as property, animals cannot bring civil suit
saying, “Although Poopi was obviously directly involved in the incident, a dog
cannot recover for emotional distress—or indeed for any other direct claims of
which we are aware. We recognize that animals can and do suffer pain or distress,
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but the evidentiary problems with such issues are obvious. As a result, the claims on
Poopi’s behalf were also not viable.”
This sort of ruling exemplifies the norm when it comes to animals as
property. It would be needless to list numerous cases in which similar judgments
were made. Instead, we can turn to consider the other side of this picture: cases
where judges clearly felt that animals are not mere property. In Carl Bueckner v.
Anthony (Tony) Hamel and Kathy Collins (1994), there was a question over whether
fair market value was an acceptable compensation for the loss of a pet dog.
Regarding this, the judge wrote:
“[Must] bereaved pet owners accept the market value of their pets as the measure of
actual damages for their pets' wrongful killing, or [do] they have the option of
accepting either the market value or the special value... the general rule of market
value [is] inadequate … I would hold that the pet owners have the option of accepting
either measure of damages. … The value of dogs to the human families … often has
nothing to do with a pedigree that is registered with the American Kennel Club.” [My
emphasis]

In another case, Morgan v. Kroupa, the court recognized that pets generally
do not fit neatly within traditional property principles... Instead, courts must fashion
and apply rules that recognize their unique status. (Wagman et al. 2010 p.74) And in
Rabideau v. City of Racine, where a dog was shot and killed by a police officer, the
judge makes a relatively passionate statement about the place of dogs in our society
and law:
At the outset we note that we are uncomfortable with the law’s cold
characterization of a dog, such as Dakota, as mere “property.” Labeling a dog
“property” fails to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship
that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to
other items of personal property. A companion dog is not a living room sofa or
dining room furniture… Nevertheless, the law categorizes the dog as personal
property… To the extent this opinion uses the term “property” in describing how
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humans value the dog they live with, it is done only as a means of applying
established legal doctrine to the facts of this case. (Wise, 2004 p. 28-9)

Likewise, in Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital, Inc. (1979):
Before answering these questions the court must first decide whether a pet such as a
dog is only an item of personal property as prior cases have held, Smith v. Palace
Transportation Co., Inc., 142 Misc. 93, 253 N.Y.S. 87. This court now overrules prior
precedent and holds that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place
somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property… In ruling that a
pet such as a dog is not just a thing I believe the plaintiff is entitled to damages
beyond the market value of the dog. A pet is not an inanimate thing that just receives
affection; it also returns it… To say it is a piece of personal property and no more is a
repudiation of our humaneness. This I cannot accept.

The statement in this case, that pets are in between a person and a piece of
property, “and the few cases that follow it, are aberrations flying in the face of
overwhelming authority to the contrary,” for example, cases such as Snyder v. BioLab, Inc. and Stettner v. Graubard. (Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc. 1994) Even
so, we can see that in these, and many other judgments, there is discomfort with the
property status of animals, and the resulting inability of most courts to award the
owners damages for emotional distress and sentimental value when their pets are
wrongly injured or killed.31
Even among those judges that do not take issue with calling animals
property, there are those that recognize animals as being a special kind of property.
In Green v. Leckington (1951) we read “…certain property, by its very nature, has an
element of sentiment essential to its existence.” In Bueckner v. Hamal (1994), the
judge says “Because of the characteristics of animals in general and of domestic pets

31

There are many such judgments. See, for example, Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster,
2004.

88

in particular, I consider them to belong to a unique category of “property” that
neither statutory nor case law has yet recognized. Sentiments like these
demonstrate an acknowledgement that whatever animals are, they are not
equivalent to inanimate objects. However, the law is not set up to recognize such
distinctions.

V. The Difference Between Protection and Right-Holding
Elements of the discussion above may seem to indicate that certain animals
do already possess certain rights. In a sense, that’s true. Animal cruelty laws, which
exist only in criminal law, may be seen as affording to those animals the right not to
be treated in certain ways. But I wish to question this interpretation. I will show that
1. Animal cruelty laws are not animal rights, that is, they are not rights belonging to
the animal him or herself,32 and 2. There is nothing approximating animal rights in
civil law. To make this case, we have to answer two questions: What does it mean to
have a right? What is the purpose of a right?
There is an entire field of legal theory devoted to such questions which I’ll
not enter into. Instead, for clarification of the issues involved, I will use the widely
accepted Hohlefdian framework for understanding what rights are and what they
entail. Hohfeld divided rights into four categories: claims, privileges, powers, and
immunities. (Wenar 2015) The kind of rights we are interested in is claim-rights. To
have this kind of right means that you have a claim on another to act or not act in a
certain way. For instance, I have a claim on you not to assault me without
32

On my understanding, no criminal violations are violations of non-governmental persons
because they are all crimes against the government.
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justification. The correlative of a claim is a duty. My claim on you indicates that you
have a duty toward me, in this case, the duty to not assault me without justification.
There are, of course, non-legal senses of the words “claim” and “duty,” but here we
are talking about only those claims which are codified by law.
Given this rubric, it may appear as if anti-cruelty laws can be understood as
claims-rights that animals have against legal persons, with the correlative duty of
persons not to engage in cruel behavior toward those animals. But here is where the
distinction lies: In the assault example, I have a claim against you. What that means
is, regardless of any criminal proceedings that may take place, I can seek restoration
for myself through the civil system. In the case of animal cruelty laws, the entity that
is acknowledged as having been wronged is either 1. (In criminal cases) the
American people/government (federal, state, municipal) which enacted the law,
and/or 2. (In Civil cases) the person who owns the harmed animal. In other words,
the government or person has the claim against certain types of animal harm. The
animal itself does not have a claim, and therefore has no right.
To be protected against some form of action means that others are restricted
in certain ways. For example, the illegality of selling a member of an endangered
species imposes a restriction on the would-be purveyor, and if that person violates
the law, he or she is held responsible. What that protection does not entail is the
right of the animal not to be sold. A right is a just or legal claim on something or on
some action. If the animal were to have a right, it would be the animal who would
have been wronged (not the government), and the animal (with the help of a human
advocate) who would be able to bring a claim to court.
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Mere protection is something that is afforded to all property. My stereo is
protected by law. Any and all property is protected in the sense that if it were to be
unduly taken from me, broken, or otherwise damaged, I would be entitled to
recompense. In this case, it is very clear that being protected does not confer rights.
The stereo has no right not to be stolen or broken, even though it is the stereo which
is protected. It is my right not to have my property messed with from which the
stereo’s protection derives. Comparing animals, such as pets, to property, such as
stereos, seems to me painfully insufficient. While there is undoubtedly a great
difference between my cognitive ability and a cat’s, there must admittedly be a
much larger difference between a cat’s cognitive ability and my stereo’s. So, if our
argument for maintaining animals as mere property is that they are not similar
enough to humans to deserve personhood, that is only a partial answer. For surely,
they are closer to humans than they are to the inanimate objects that comprise the
bulk of material protected under property law.
At this point, one may point out that in my example it is not technically the
stereo that is being protected under the law, but rather it is I who am being
protected from having my property damaged. Therefore, one might say that anticruelty laws, in specifically protecting animals, are really conferring rights on them.
I’m willing to acknowledge that it may seem like animals already do possess some
rights (though rather paltry ones) in the realm of criminal law. However, “criminal
rights” is not a real category, since under these laws it is really the government that
is being protected. The only rights individuals have are in the civil realm. And there
is no analogous law in civil court that directly protects animals.
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Animals do not have legal claims, because only persons do. All entities
considered property have no recourse under civil law. They cannot seek damages
and they have no legal voice. Thus, when an animal is abused by its owner, there is,
somewhat absurdly, no crime against the animal. Therefore, even if the abuser is
found guilty, the animal is not guaranteed to receive any benefit from any fines (civil
or criminal) that the abuser is required to pay. This is an essential difference
between causing damage to a person and to a nonperson; the former can receive the
damages, and can decide how to spend them, while the nonperson is at the mercy of
the suing party. Some of the money may be used to help the animal, or it may not be.
That is to say, legal protection does not entail legal rights.

VI. David Favre’s Equitable Self-Ownership
The person who has come the closest to providing a solution to this
discrepancy is, in my opinion, David Favre. Although his proposal is not entirely
satisfying in terms of the points made in the previous section, if an argument could
be made that sentient animals could remain property and be treated fairly, Favre
makes it.
Favre (2010) states that his goal is make the relationship of an owner to her
cat less like that of an owner to a rock and more like that of a parent to a child, that
is, a custodial relationship. He asks, “Can there be created a new property status that
would allow animals to have rights?” (p. 12) He discussed, as I have done, the
difference between criminal and civil rights, correctly saying that such rights “must
be actionable, enforceable by the animal him or herself. The key limitation of the
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present right of animals… is that… if the state decides not to act in a particular case,
then the harmed animal is without remedy.” (p. 16)
He notes that our legal system allows a property owner to divide the title
over property into two: the legal title and the equitable title. This is a tool commonly
used when the owner of property is not the one who is in control of it. An example of
when this might happen is when an estate is bequeathed to a child who is incapable
of maintaining it. In this case, while the child maintains the equitable title to the
estate, someone else is given the legal title in order to make decisions about the
estate on behalf of the child, and in his or her best interest.
Since animals are a kind of property, one could split up the elements of their
title in the same way. According to Favre, this would provide a framework for
allocating more rights to some animals. An owner of an animal could transfer the
equitable title of the animal to the animal his or herself. The human would maintain
the legal title, essentially creating in the human a legal obligation to act in the
animal’s best interest, i.e. making the human a guardian.
On the surface, this appears to accomplish a lot of what is missing. But this
view has several problems, ranging from moderate to serious. One moderate
problem is that Favre’s view says nothing about what qualities make an animal able
to possess equitable self-ownership. In other words, could all domestic animals
theoretically have equitable ownership over themselves? One might think that some
criterion, such as a certain level of intelligence or sentience would be a good way to
make the distinction, but he makes no suggestion. To the contrary, he asserts that
such a system would apply to any living thing, saying, “unless a human has an
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affirmatively asserted lawful dominion and control so as to obtain title to a living
entity, then a living entity will be considered to have self-ownership” (p. 236) It is
not entirely clear whether he is using imprecise language here or making a rather
strong claim that he only discussed in detail regarding animals. Either way, I
consider this is a moderate problem because it is easily fixed by specifying the
domain over which such a paradigm would range.
The biggest problem, however, with Favre’s view is that it further confuses
the categories of personhood and property rather than clarifying them. On one
hand, he acknowledges that animals would still be property, as the title of his paper
on the topic is “A New Property Status for Animals.” On the other hand, he seems to
consider those animals persons as well, saying, “As entities with legally recognized
interests, self-owned animals have sufficient status as juristic persons so as to be
able to hold equitable interest in other property.” (p. 243, emphasis added) For
Favre, certain animals would be both property and persons. But this is precisely the
problem we already have! Certain animals (along with other entities) do not fit
easily into the existing legal dichotomy, and Favre’s suggestion does not fix that.

I hope I have made clear the nature of the problem. Animals (and other
groups such as fetuses) live in legal limbo. They are not fully persons, nor are they
fully property. Many of our judges have seen the issue, but they are both bound to
the categorical schism and are unable to fix it. The proposal that follows is my
attempt at a solution.
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Chapter 5: Legal Patiency – Developing a New Category for Sentient
Nonpersons
I. A Recap of the Discussion So far
Before introducing my framework, I’d like to rehash the points thus far
established. In Chapter One, I introduced the issue of animal treatment in America,
describing some of the many ways that we use and interact with animals. I showed
how, both legally and socially, we are of two minds about which forms of animal
treatment are acceptable. We tend to think that it is wrong to harm certain animals
such as mammals, but only if these are animals with whom we have a special
relationship. We protect many animals via anti-cruelty laws, but only insofar as it
does not disrupt human industry. We simultaneously view them as vulnerable
beings in need of protection and as exploitable resources.
Chapter Two reviewed some of the scientific literature regarding animal
sentience (understood as the ability to suffer). I described some of the most
common physiological and behavioral markers of sentience, arguing that there is
ample evidence present that many animals have this ability. Although there are
many species about whom we are unsure, some clear groups of nonhumans that can
feel at least physical pain include mammals and birds. Next, I argued in support of
sentiocentrism, the view that sentience is a quality which makes any being in
possession of it morally considerable, and also defended it against certain attacks.
Whether or not sentience admits of degrees, any degree is enough to be included in
the sphere of our moral concern.
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In Chapter Three I introduced the two main camps of animal activist, the
animal welfarists and the animal rights proponents, discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of the various positions found therein. Although both groups have good
intentions, I argued that neither approach is sufficient to solving the present issue.
In particular, welfarists don’t necessarily think that animals need rights to be
sufficiently protected, and rights proponents often think that certain animals should
be made legal persons. I disagreed with both of these views, and suggested that the
paucity of viable suggestions reflects lack of sufficient legal infrastructure to deal
with sentient nonpersons.
Finally, in Chapter Four I began by discussing two groups who also occupy
rather odd legal stations, fetuses and corporations, and the inconsistencies of both
groups’ legal treatment. This was followed by a demonstration of the mixed feelings
judges have about labeling animals (and pets in particular) as mere property. I then
discussed the philosophical and legal differences between being protected under the
law, and possessing rights. I argued that only rights would be able to ensure the
proper treatment of sentient animals.
So that brings us here, to Chapter Five, where I will lay out a framework that
I think is capable of bridging the gap, both between the philosophical perspectives
such as animal welfarism and animal rights and between the legal categories of
personhood and property. Not only is it theoretically possible, but also quite
feasible.
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II. Which Rights Should SNP’s Get?
In a sense, it is helpful to start from scratch in considering rights for sentient
nonpersons. If they deserve any rights, it would seem that a good place to begin
would be the most basic rights that persons enjoy. Some basic rights, such as
freedom of religion, are probably not applicable to nonhuman animals. But others
certainly are. There are two main categories of such rights that sentient animals
need. The first is some degree of freedom from bodily harm or injury, and the
second is the right to receive recompense directly for any harm or injury done to
them. The latter would take the form of the ability to bring a civil case to court and
sue for damages. I am focusing on these two kinds of right because they are
foundational to many other rights, but are still quite general with a lot of room for
interpretation and development.
These rights could also theoretically be applied to wild animals, which
possibility I revisit briefly in Chapter Six. However, the present discussion will be
limited to animals that are under human care and/or control for the following
reasons. To include wild animals would require a larger scope than this paper
allows. For example, we would need a policy that addresses Americans’ treatment of
animals internationally, with many associated complexities. Moreover, wild animals
in the U.S. are living under very different circumstances than the ones we choose to
have in our lives.
The right against bodily harm, i.e. the right to bodily integrity, is, I take it, one
of the most basic rights a sentient being can have. Although this is not a specific
right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the so-called right to privacy is often
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interpreted as including bodily integrity and therefore bodily harm. This is found in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, and reads
as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Currently, this right has only been applied to human beings. The right to bodily
integrity is defined as, “the right of each human being, including children, to
autonomy and self-determination over their own body. It considers an unconsented
physical intrusion as a human rights violation.” (CRIN 2017) This principle is often
used in reference to torture and inhumane treatment. The Eighth Amendment of the
United Sates prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” which are defined as those
that are one or more of 1. Degrading to human dignity, 2. Inflicted arbitrarily, 3.
Societally rejected, and 4. Patently unnecessary. These conditions were established
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978, which also said that no state should pass a law
obviously violating any one of these.
A similar protection is included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which was adopted by the UN in 1948. Though not legally binding, this document
has been influential in the development of many international laws and
constitutions. Article three reads, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of person." (UN) Another international treaty, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, has been adopted by 169 parties as of 2017. Excerpts from
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Articles 6 -9 read:
Every human being has the inherent right to life… No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or
scientific experimentation… No one shall be held in slavery… Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person… All persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person.” (United Nations Human Rights 1966)

There are exceptions allowed to some of these as punishments for crimes.
This gives us an idea of what our country and the international community
consider to be the fundamental human right to freedom from bodily harm. It is
important to note that most of these rules are not without exception. For instance,
the death penalty is allowed by all the documents just mentioned. This may appear
to contradict the right to life that they speak of, but such a right is not considered
inalienable, and so it is not absolute. Whatever rights we decide sentient animals
must have, they will likely turn out to be alienable as well. That is, there may certain
circumstances that warrant exceptions to otherwise universal claims.
Given this understanding, it does not seem too complicated a task to apply
the standards of freedom from bodily harm to nonhuman animal care and to be
clear on when they are violated. I take it that the more complicated issue would be
to identify those situations in which violations should be permitted. For now, it will
be enough to argue that SNP’s do in fact need this right. If one of the bases for the
right to bodily integrity is autonomy and self-determination, than it seems that
many other animals have this right as well. Thanks in part to Steven Wise, there is a
fairly large literature on whether any other species have these traits, saying “a
minimum level of autonomy — the abilities to desire, to act intentionally and to
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have some sense of self, whatever the species — is sufficient to justify the basic legal
right to bodily integrity. I call this level ‘practical autonomy’ and maintain that a
creature who demonstrates it, whether an adult chimpanzee, bonobo, gorilla,
orangutan, Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphin or human, is entitled to this basic legal
right.” (Wise 2002) I do not think it is necessary to argue that other animals have
this ability, since Wise has done so at length.33 If he is right though, then the basis
for human rights also supports rights for some nonhumans.
So let us move on to the second type of right I am advocating, the right to sue
and be made whole. In case any legal patients’ rights were violated, that animal
should be able to seek damages for that infraction. As it currently stands, the state
or country is the party considered wronged in criminal animal abuse cases, while
the animal’s owner is the injured party in civil cases. However, all sentient
nonpersons, or legal patients, should have the right to seek damages by suing in civil
court in order for them to be able to take action against and receive benefits from
the party that caused it suffering or injury. In legal jargon, this process is called
“making whole”. To take this term literally would be a mistake, for in most instances
it is not possible to undo the damage caused to a victim. It would be more useful to
think of making whole as receiving reparations, compensating a party for a loss
sustained. The precise definition varies, but making whole may include actual
economic losses and/or non-economic losses, such as loss of companionship.
(Gideon n.d.)

See his books, Rattling the Cage (2000); Drawing the Line (2003). It is also worth noting
that the word “autonomy” is not always used to mean the same thing. For an overview of
various uses, see Christman (2018).
33
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The right to sue for damages is considered a fundamental human right in the
U.S. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB made the point that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” In another
case in 2002, Sandra Day O’Connor noted that the right to sue in court was a form of
petition, and said, “We have recognized this right to petition as one of the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”(BE&K Construction Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board) Despite the more recent nature of these
statements, the right to petition can be traced back to English documents such as the
Magna Carta and the later Bill of Rights 1689, which clearly assert the "right of the
subjects to petition the king." (Blackstone 2008) An individual may also sue another
person in civil lawsuits. In either case, civil cases are there to determine whether
the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries, and if so, to compensate the victim
for the harm done to her or him. These cases can be brought by, or on behalf of, any
legal person.34
By definition, a sentient nonperson can be harmed. However, they are not
capable (as far as we know) of filing a suit on their own behalf. Were those animals
given the right to sue, the court would have to allow a third party to represent the
animal in court. One of the most frequently stated reasons that courts have denied
this right to animals in the past is the slippery slope argument. Judges have been and
are worried that if the door is opened to animals suing as plaintiffs that the courts
There is a further issue, legal standing, which I will not foray into. The question of
standing is essentially about when one can bring a case on behalf of someone other than
oneself. This issue has been brought to the forefront by animal and environmental law in
particular, as those both involve harm to entities other than persons. (Wagman et al. 2010)
34

101

will be overwhelmed with such cases. A related version of this argument is that once
we allow the most intelligent (i.e. most human) animals to sue, what’s to say that we
will be unable to draw a line, and suddenly every half-squashed earthworm will be
allowed to have its day in court. In Lock v. Falkenstein, a 1963 case regarding the
legality of cockfighting, the judge presented this reasoning:
[W]e reach the conclusion that the type of cruelty to animal statute we are
construing was not passed with the intention of prohibiting such sports as cock
fighting. We further believe that, to so construe the statute, would open up many
other activities to prosecution, though they are not within its spirit. For example,
using live minnows to bait hooks…. Society could not long tolerate a system of laws
which might drag to the criminal bar every lady who might impale a butterfly, or
every man who might drown a litter of kittens. (Lock v. Falkenstein 1963)

Despite the remark about kittens, I do see the concern here. There is a hypothetical
that must be acknowledged: It may turn out that many more animals are deserving
of protection than can be reasonably protected. I think there are common sense
responses we can make to allay these concerns, which I will return to in Chapter Six.
However, the main point, that there is nowhere to draw the line, is no more
true of nonhuman animals than it is of humans. The line I am suggesting is
sentience. Now, of course, there is debate about what counts as sentience (as
discussed in Chapter Two) and about whether sentience is a threshold trait or exists
on a continuum (as it appears that most abilities do). And I do agree that these
questions require a fair amount of attention. But that does not mean that
unanswered questions are a reasonable justification for perpetuating an injustice,
and maintaining the legality of unnecessarily harming sentient beings in ways which
are clearly avoidable.
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III. Existing Legal Structures for Human Incompetents
The most relevant group of humans is incompetent humans. Civil law
requires legal competency to enter a contract, sign a will, or make other types of
binding legal commitments. (Legal Dictionary 2018) Humans may be deemed
incompetent for many reasons, but two of the most common ones are age and
mental impairment.35 I will focus on the former for the majority of this section, and
discuss how the current model that is in place for such humans would work for
SNP’s.
Child protection laws were not always as robust as they are today. The
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children was founded in New York in 1875 as
the first organization devoted solely to child protection. This was 9 years after
Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded. (Meyers 2008) Prior to
this time there was occasional intervention in cruel treatment of children, but this
involvement was infrequent and unreliable. In fact, for a long time children were
considered the property of their parents, and, as such, the latter were legally
allowed to do what they wanted with them. (Wagman et al. 2010) The belief was
that “the family was a private domain and as such should be free from state
interference.” (p. 62) Children could be given, transferred, or bequeathed by their
parents. They were treated as a commodity in support of the parents’ rights.

Some states expand the realm of incompetent persons to include fetuses at certain
developmental stages. (Roden 2010)
35
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(Maillard 2012) No “governmental agency or non-governmental organization was
responsible for child protection” at that time. (Meyers 2008, p. 451-2)36
After the inception of the NYSPCC, similar organizations arose all over the
country. This momentum led to the creation of America’s first juvenile court in
1899, which had the jurisdiction to intervene in cases of child abuse and neglect.
(Meyers 2008) The tide slowly shifted toward a realization that “if children are to be
protected from neglect the service must be performed by public agencies.” (Falconer
1935) The Federal Children’s Bureau was the first government agency to be formed
for the protection of children in 1912. By the mid 1960’s almost every state had laws
putting responsibility for child protection with the government. The watershed
moment occurred in 1974 with the passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act. This provided federal funds for identifying and treating child abuse
and neglect. (National Child Abuse and Neglect Training Publications Project 2014)
But even then, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that children were actually given legal
representation in court. (Wagman et al. 2010)
Even today, in child custody cases, the courts more often reference the child’s
interests than the child’s rights.37 But there are several important ways in which
children do have rights. In the criminal realm, children are entitled to a safe
environment, good nutrition, healthcare, and education. Parents do have a pretty
Two of the seminal cases that reinforced those principles were Meyer v. Nebraska 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) which recognized the authority of parents to make basic choices for
their children, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925) which struck down an
Oregon statute requiring children to attend public school.
37 There is also an interesting question about the “peculiar triangle of rights” between a
parent, child, and the state, and how the state approaches apparent conflicts between those
parties. See Brumley “Parental Control of a Minor’s Right to Sue in Federal Court” for a
discussion.
36
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broad right to raise their children as they see fit, but if a parent is not meeting the
child’s basic needs, the state can remove her or him. Minors also have rights under
the U.S. Constitution. They have the right to equal protection and are also entitled to
due process. As children age and become more mature, they accrue other rights,
such as a limited right to free speech and a right to work. Despite all these
guarantees, there are some rights that minors do not have. Children are not allowed
to vote, hold property, consent to medical treatment, sue or be sued, or enter into
certain types of contracts, at least not without a legal guardian acting on their behalf.
(Find Law 2019d) We will return to the issue of suing shortly.
Minors are not only protected by criminal law, but also by civil law. There are
two ways that children are represented in court, by a court appointed attorney (the
specific title varies by state) and/or by a guardian ad litem (GAL). A lawyer can be
hired to represent the child her or himself. In divorce and custody cases the court
may appoint a lawyer for the child. If the court does not think a lawyer is necessary,
a parent or guardian has the option to hire one. However, the court always appoints
a lawyer in juvenile court cases involving abuse, neglect, or delinquency. (CT Law
Help n.d.) When a lawyer is hired to represent a child, she or he must be hired by an
adult who has been put in charge of the child’s care in one way or another.
While the court appointed attorney represents the child’s legal interests and
supports the child’s best interests, a GAL represents only the latter. The GAL is a
person the court appoints to investigate what solutions would be in the “best
interests of a child.” While the specific laws vary by state, there are some
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commonalities nation-wide. Here is an example from Maine of the reasons for which
a GAL may be appointed:
The court may appoint a guardian ad litem when the court has reason for special
concern as to the welfare of a minor child. In determining whether an appointment
must be made, the court shall consider:
A. The wishes of the parties…
B. The age of the child…
C. The nature of the proceeding, including the contentiousness of the hearing…
D. The financial resources of the parties…
E. The extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing information
concerning the best interest of the child…
F. Whether the family has experienced a history of domestic abuse…
G. Abuse of the child by one of the parties… and
H. Other factors the court determines relevant. (Maine Title 19-A, 3.51)

This is a pretty loose set of requirements, most notably with the last consideration
of “other factors”.
The GAL can be a lawyer or certain types of mental health professional. The
court can ask the GAL to look into the child’s overall situation and make
recommendations about things like parental rights. But usually, the court will ask
the GAL to look into specific issues like mental health or medical records of the
parents or child, or a parent’s current ability to make rational decisions about a
child’s care. This is called a “limited-purpose appointment” and will usually name
particular people the GAL needs to talk to. The Court may also order the GAL to
provide an oral or written report. The law requires parents or guardians to
cooperate with the GAL and follow all of their reasonable requests. (Pine Tree Legal
Assistance n.d.) Interestingly, the GAL is required to make the wishes of the child
known to the court if the child has expressed any, even if those wishes do not align
with the GAL recommendations.
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The other important role that the GAL has is that she or he (or the courtappointed attorney) can sue on the child’s behalf if unrelated to the case. In that
way, there is someone looking out not only for the child’s interests, but for the
child’s rights.38 A parent or guardian can also sue on the child’s behalf. These three
individuals, the parent, guardian, and guardian ad litem have prudential (courtgiven) standing to sue on behalf of a third party because while older children may
be able to file a suit for themselves in certain circumstances, children generally are
not presumed to be able to sue on their own behalf.
There are, of course, some disanalogies between human children and SNP’s.
For one, SNP’s will never graduate to adulthood and be able to take control of their
own legal battles. Most of them will never be able to express themselves in English
to the court or take the witness stand. But that is also true of some humans with
severe mental disabilities whom we nevertheless believe have the right to an
attorney and to have someone looking out for their best interests. In cases where a
person has a mental incapacity such that she can no longer understand enough to
manage her own affairs or make important decisions about her life, a guardianship
is necessary. (The Elder Law Clinic) In addition to the guardian, an incompetent
person may also have a guardian ad litem and a court appointed attorney, just as a
minor would. A person is not deprived of their right to sue merely due to
incompetence.

One interesting civil right that certain minors have is emancipation. In cases where a child
both desires and deserves to be free from the control of his or her parents, the child can sue.
Sometimes this is referred to as divorce. In either case, it involves the termination of
parental rights and means the minor is now treated as a self-dependent adult. This sort of
framework may apply to certain nonhuman animals, but I won’t argue that point here.
38
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IV. Incorporating SNP’s into the Existing Structure
Were sentient nonhumans to be given the basic rights discussed earlier in
this chapter, they could be treated in much the same way as human incompetents,
and this method of representation could be extended to them. Once it has been
determined that an animal has experienced an actionable harm at the hands of a
human, the animal’s guardian (a.k.a. owner) or other interested party would file suit
on the animal’s behalf. This is the part where they get civil rights, because we could
say here that an animal was suing for damages. If the guardian is not the person
filing suit (possibly because the owner was the one who inflicted the harm) the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the animals’ interests in court.
Just as with minors, the GAL would have the authority to examine the animal’s and
relevant humans’ medical, veterinary, and mental health records, where
appropriate. The court would also appoint an attorney (unless the animal’s guardian
hired one) who would legally represent the animal in the court case. Both the GAL
and the attorney would treat the animal as their client, seeking only that which was
in the animal’s legal and/or best interests. Importantly, just as with minors, these
two individuals are in no way beholden to the animal’s guardian, so that there is no
conflict of interest.39
Now what happens if the animal wins? The most common type of damages
awarded in tort cases is monetary damages. The court would determine what

While I’m focusing here on individual suits, this method could presumably be applied to
class action suits where the care of a group of animals deviates from accepted standards,
such as in puppy mills, factory farms, etc.
39
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amount may be awarded to the animal in order to make her or him whole. For
instance, the court could consider what kinds of care the animal would need to
regain health moving forward, and what those would cost. In the same way that a
guardian or GAL would be responsible for taking care of their charge’s property in
the case of a human incompetent, the animal’s guardian or GAL would be
responsible for seeing to the animal’s care. The fact that the money would “belong”
to the animal is not a problem, as animals can already be the beneficiaries of trusts.
(Dickinson 2017). The guardian would only have to follow the court’s orders and
the animal’s best interest in dispensing the money.
Let us now consider an example of this might play out in a likely situation.
Say a man was fighting his dogs. First, someone would have to lodge a complaint
with the court. Who is allowed to do this varies considerably by state. It would then
be up to the court to decide whether the case has merit. If it does, then the case
would go to court, and the court would assign a GAL and attorney for the dog, who
would sue the owner on the dog’s behalf. In this hypothetical scenario, let’s say that
the dog had suffered a broken leg and lacerated face due to the fights he was forced
to take part in by the owner. The GAL would be directed by the court to look into the
mental and criminal history of the owner and the veterinary records for the dog. She
might also be asked to speak with relevant parties, such as the owner and other
people who have interacted with the dog regularly including neighbors, etc. The GAL
would make this material available to the lawyer and the court, and the lawyer
would argue the case with the dog as his client. If the owner were found guilty then
the court might determine that the way to make the dog whole would be to provide
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him with veterinary treatment for his injuries and to find him a suitable home. The
court would fine the owner in direct proportion to the cost of these restitutions. The
money would be held in escrow until the GAL used the money, on the dog’s behalf,
and in compliance with the court’s order. The dog would receive the treatment he
needs and, legally speaking, would be made whole.
As a reminder, the issue with the current system is that animals are not
themselves the beneficiaries of damages received for harms done to them. If an
owner sues another human because of harm this human caused to the pet, the
owner is the one who gets that money. The owner can then use the money in any
way that she sees fit, to benefit the injured pet or not. This only acknowledges that
the owner was wronged; it does nothing to recognize that the pet was harmed and is
himself deserving of restitution.
Furthermore, nothing I am suggesting here would require an overhaul of our
legal system. As we have seen, this type of system is already in place and welltrodden in regards to incompetent humans. What I am suggesting is that we also
include SNP’s under the existing system. Such treatment is entirely consistent with
their lacking full personhood and it would make clear that SNP’s are sentient beings
who can be harmed, and deserve restitution for certain of those harms. We can
wrongfully cause damage to beings who are not capable of representing themselves
in court, regardless of their species membership.
Connecticut has actually made more strides toward this than any other U.S.
state. Desmond’s Law (2016) was a law inspired by a shelter dog who was starved,
beaten, and strangled to death by his owner. (Pallotta n.d.) The abuser got away
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with only Accelerated Rehabilitation (a program CT has for defendants charged with
certain crimes or violations if the court thinks it unlikely that they will commit
future crimes), and the incident has been expunged from his record. (State of CT
Judicial Branch) Here’s the abridged text of the law:
Section 1. … [R]egarding the welfare or custody of a cat or dog, the court may
order… that a separate advocate be appointed to represent the interests of
justice…
The advocate may: (1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual with
information that could aid the judge or fact finder and review records relating to
the condition of the cat or dog and the defendant's actions, including, but not
limited to, records from animal control officers, veterinarians and police
officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4) present information or recommendations
to the court…
The Department of Agriculture shall maintain a list of attorneys with knowledge
of animal issues and the legal system and a list of law schools that have
students… with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such attorneys
and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis as advocates….
(emphasis added)

There are clearly limitations to this law, not the least of which is the restriction of
scope to cats and dogs, however the law has thus far been used with success in
several cases. On June 2, 2017, a UConn law student, Taylor Hansen, under the
supervision of a professor, testified in a dogfighting case. She described the abuse
suffered by the dogs and cited studies linking violence against animals and humans.
Because of this testimony, the judge decided to prevent the defendant from having
dogs in his home for at least two years. The ALDF notes that, “Though an important
and innovative legal development, the representation provided for under
Desmond’s Law seems to stop short of granting guardian ad litem status. According
to the statutory language, advocates are appointed to represent the ‘interests of
justice’ rather than those of the animal.” (ALDF 2017) Certainly this is true,
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however, given that the intent of the law is to provide advocacy for cats and dogs,
this still represents a huge leap in the direction of assigning GAL’s for nonhumans.

V. Bridging Welfare, Rights, and Other Views
As discussed in Chapter Three, much of the discussion of animal law and
policy has traditionally taken place within the framework of welfare and rights.
Welfare positions maintain that animals can be given sufficient protection while
remaining members of the property category, while rights activists tend to argue
that (at least some) animals should be promoted to legal personhood. The proposal
I’ve outlined above was presented as a middle ground between the two legal
categories, but it is also meant to be a way of accommodating the strengths of the
various views, while avoiding the detriments found in each.
In the previous chapter I raised three with concerns Garner, two with Wise,
three with Francione, and three with Kagan. We’ll start with Garner. Garner
suggested that animals could have rights as property. I felt that this idea further
muddled the categories of person and property rather than clarifying them. The
distinguishing characteristic of persons is their possession of civil rights. To say
property has these rights is to misunderstand the nature of the current dichotomy.
Legal patiency sidesteps the dichotomy in order to give sentient beings civil rights
without full-blown personhood. Next, Garner has said, “welfare statutes are
sometimes weak and enforced ineffectively, although this is not primarily because
animals are regarded as property.” (Francione & Garner 2010, p. 133) I argued
against this claim already. I think it is mainly because they are considered property
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that laws protecting them are weak and unenforced. Lastly, Garner also believes
that welfare reforms are more likely to be accepted by people than animal
personhood. I believe that welfare reforms are insufficient, though I agree that it is
unlikely that any animals will be granted personhood either (see my response to
Wise below). The new category would solve both of those problems. It would do
more than merely improve animals’ property status, and it would not require
animal personhood.
Wise puts his hopes in attaining personhood for certain species. I wish him
God’s speed. As mentioned, I think it highly unlikely that this will happen in the near
future, although would be perfectly content if it did. Rather, I do not think we should
put all our proverbial chickens in this one, hard-to-attain basket. For one, most
people (as laid out in Chapter One) want animals to be protected more than they
currently are, and they even tend to agree with the “rights” language. Second, most
people do not think animals are the same as humans (or as high on the so-called
evolutionary tree), and would object to including them as persons. Taken together,
these bode well for a new category that meets both requirements. We can give
animals real, meaningful rights without raising them to the status of humans. Wise
also focuses on advanced cognitive abilities only, thereby leaving out those
creatures who are sentient but without complex cognition. Legal patiency makes
neither of those mistakes. I argued in Chapter Two that sentience is the correct
threshold for deserving rights. There are clearly many sentient animals who would
not be considered fully autonomous under Wise’s account. He would ignore these
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animals, leaving them out in the rightless cold. My account includes all sentient
beings regardless of other higher cognitive abilities.
Fancione believes several curious things. He thinks that all of our uses of
animals treat them as mere resources, and are therefore unethical. However,
identifying a large number of species as legal patients would make it illegal to treat
them as mere resources (at least insofar as such treatment tends to align with
mistreatment). Next, Francione is convinced that accepting incrementalism will
stifle greater, categorical change. Well, my suggestion is literally about changing
categories and allowing sentient beings to be classified in a manner that would
better address their needs. Third, he focuses on negative obligations and noninterference, ignoring positive and relational obligations. My two overarching
categories of rights include both: the protection against certain forms of bodily harm
is negative, while the right to sue in court is positive (and potentially relational).
Finally, he also conflates the concepts of personhood and sentience. Legal patiency
can avoid all these problems, real or imagined. Lastly, introducing the third category
allows for personhood and property statuses to remain largely unaffected. We
would not have to fundamentally redefine either in the way that Francione’s
suggestion would require.
Kagan’s view has several problematic elements. The first is that agency has
more moral primacy than sentience. As discussed in Chapter Two, I think nonborderline sentience is the morally relevant threshold to be considered a legal
patient. Presumably degrees of agency would have a place in determining
personhood, but that is not my present concern. The second is his focus on
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hierarchical thinking. Although we can easily conceive of the three categories of
property, patient, and person as being hierarchical, I don’t see that as being
necessary to a consistent and functional legal system. Finally, he seems determined
to maintain human exceptionalism even when there is no clear reason to do so. A
perfectly consistent system of law and ethics would likely not consider all human
beings as persons. This is something I explore briefly in Chapter Six. However, it is
still plausible that, even if my proposal of third category were accepted, all human
beings would maintain their personhood status. This would not necessarily be for
reasons of consistency, but for reasons of practicality and comfort. I have no issue
admitting that such concerns play a role, but object if they lead to diminishing a
group’s rights. In the current case, the only “risk” is conferring additional rights.
To my mind, each of the positions discussed is significantly flawed. My hope
is that by presenting an alternative to the current dialectical options, we can find a
way to a system that makes more legal, philosophical, and practical sense. We don’t
have to redefine property in such a way that it can accommodate right-bearing
individuals. And we don’t have to make the admittedly big jump to calling some
animals persons. Instead, we can recognize and respect sentient animals for who
they are by separating them from both categories.
Inherent in the above discussion of the weakness of those views is their
strengths. It is a strength to not force humans to include animals in the same
category as themselves, if not for moral reasons, then for practical ones. It is a
strength not to have sentient beings in the same category as toasters. It is a strength
to be able to give those animals actual rights, so that they cannot be wantonly
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abused and exploited. Finally, it is a strength not to muddle the two categories we
already have, when a large issue with the current system is those categories’
inadequacies. For all these reasons, I believe my proposal would be a useful bridge
between the various views.
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Chapter 6: Application and Practice
I. Effects on our legal system
Before I get into some of the broader implications of sentient
nonpersonhood, there are some questions to answer regarding how an additional
category would affect and fit in with our current legal system. To some extent, I
answered this in the previous chapter, but there is more to be said about how
guidelines of treatment would be established, given the great variety of
domesticated animals and the many roles they occupy in our current society.
Regarding the latter, there might be concern over whether such a move would place
an undue burden on our courts. Additionally, it must be clear what the goal of the
courts would be in terms of making an animal “whole”.
In order to clarify how new animal rights would be specified, we can look to
existing patterns of law and policy. Generally speaking, the legislature passes laws
which are broad: they may include vague or ambiguous wording and very general
requirements. As part of the law, one or more government agencies may be charged
with filling in the missing details through a process called rule-making. (Schoenbrod
2008) There are upsides and downsides to this method which are beyond the
purview of this chapter. As an example, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 begins
with a statement of purpose, to “conserve to the extent practicable the various
species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction” and to “provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved.” (16 U.S. Code § 1531) Many of the associated duties,
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such as determining which animals are endangered and determining which
ecosystems should therefore be protected, are delegated to the Secretary of
Commerce. In doing so, the Secretary is directed by the ESA to take into
consideration input from any agency (Federal or State) which has a hand in
conservation. The Secretary must justify, in writing, and divergence from this input.
There is also an Endangered Species Committee whose job it is to decide on
requests from exemptions. In day-to-day practice, agencies such as the EPA and
USDA are very involved in the application of the ESA. For instance, the EPA is
responsible for determining whether listed species or their associated habitat may
be affected by use of certain products such as pesticides. The point of all this is that
even though the legislature passes laws, there are many other people and groups
involved in fleshing out those laws and what it means to follow them.
Likewise, with any new animal legislation, it would fall to specific non-legislative
parties to specify the exact meaning and scope of the law. If the U.S. legal system
were to create this third category of sentient nonpersons, the law would not have to
immediately specify the species that would fall under it. Nor would it have to
determine the specific actions which would be allowed or prohibited in keeping
with the recognition of animal rights. Much of this detail would stem from research
and contributions from such places as the Office for Laboratory Animal Welfare at
the National Institute of Health, whose input would fill in the particulars. For that
reason, it would not be all that informative for me to speculate on these particulars.
So the rest of this chapter will be talking in broad swaths about what effects civil
rights for animals might have.
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When I discuss this my proposal with lawyers, they often bring up the
concern that both lawyers and courts are already swamped with human cases.
There are two ways to answer this concern. The first is moral: Something being
difficult is not a sufficient reason to not do it. However, understanding that there are
real logistical concerns, and that rarely does our government change based on
principle alone, there is a second answer: It would not necessarily increase the
workload as much as it might first appear. To understand why this is so, we can look
at a Connecticut law which was passed on 2016: Desmond’s Law. Desmond’s Law is
a law that allows legal advocates to testify on behalf of cats and dogs in cruelty and
neglect cases. Advocates can be appointed by a judge or requested by prosecutors or
defense attorneys. These advocates are pro-bono attorneys or law students, who are
enabled by the court to gather information, conduct research, and make
recommendations to the court. Because they are volunteers, this process places no
additional work on private or public prosecutors. (Pallotta 2017)
These advocates play a role similar to the guardian ad litem role discussed
earlier, but they are not formally recognized as such because the dogs and cats do
not have a status that would allow them legal guardians. Even so, this program has
so far yielded many successes. In addition to having the animals’ interests
represented in court, law students have been able to gain valuable experience in the
courtroom. Were the U.S. to enact a law allowing sentient nonpersons to sue in civil
courts, the program could be begun under this framework. One hundred and
nineteen Law schools already have animal law classes, and the Animal Legal Defense
Fund has chapters at one hundred and forty-nine schools.
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I’d also like to revisit the question of making the animal victim whole.40 When
we say that the court can award damages to an animal in order to make them whole,
this term, to “make whole,” may give some people pause. There is, after all, no way
to undo certain harms, no way to make an animal whole in the sense of repairing
permanent psychological or physical damages. It is therefore important to make
clear that in using this term, I am referencing its legal definition only. Legally
speaking, to make whole (also called indemnity) means to “pay or award damages
sufficient to put the party who was damaged back into the position he/she would
have been without the fault of another.” (Hill & Hill 2005) Unfortunately, the precise
definition varies, according to individual contracts and location. But the overarching
idea is that to make whole is to compensate a party for a loss sustained. Even so, this
conception does not appear to address such long-term harms as we might expect to
result from the various abuses prohibited by law. Perhaps because of the potential
murkiness involved in restoring a victim to a pre-damaged state, the means of
compensation most often used is monetary. Monetary values are commonly given to
such things as emotional distress and loss of companionship, which are not
fundamentally monetary harms. I see no reason to think that the principles that we
use for irreparable injuries in cases with legally incompetent humans would apply
any differently in nonhuman animal cases. So if one dislikes the way the phrase “to
make whole” is used in the present essay, it is a larger issue with the way we use
that term in the legal realm, and not one that specifically applies to nonhuman
animals.

40

Thanks to Lori Gruen for raising this issue.
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II. Reevaluating Animal Uses in Human Industry
The move I am suggesting would obviously have significant ramifications on
the various animal-related industries in the U.S. It would be an overreach to try to
specify exactly what these effects would be in each affected industry. However, we
can identify some broad patterns across three of the biggest industries: farming,
research, and entertainment.
As a reminder, I am arguing that sentient nonpersons are deserving of two
sorts of right: the right against certain bodily harms or injuries, and the right to sue
directly for any harm or injury done to them. Violations of the former would be
cause of action to sue under the latter. Much of the fallout in animal industries will
result from certain prohibitions of treatment. The kinds of harms we might wish to
avoid I will take from the topic of cruel and unusual punishment mentioned in
Chapter Five. The elements of cruel and unusual punishment include those harms
that violate one’s dignity, are inflicted arbitrarily, are socially rejected, and are
unnecessary. On the assumptions that 1. Most of us wish to avoid such behaviors,
and 2. Sentient animals are capable of being harmed in these ways, then we must
reconsider many of the ways we treat sentient nonhumans. In other words, if it is
possible to violate those criteria for nonhumans, then many things we do to them
may be classified as cruel and unusual.
As a caveat, I am aware that these standards “cruel and unusual” were
developed with punishments in mind, and the ways in which we use animals do not
generally qualify as punishments. Nevertheless, I think the standards set out there
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are quite useful. First, it is precisely because we are not punishing these animals that
treating them in these ways is unacceptable. They have done nothing objectionable,
and it is likely that most of the animals we use are not even capable of acting
immorally (on the usual understanding of what morality entails). Second, if we think
that some treatments are intolerable for the most vile and violent human beings,
then how much more so for those creatures who are neither. If a rapist and
murderer or terrorist deserves humane treatment, how can we possibly argue that
sentient animals don’t? That is why I think it is both fair and useful to consider our
treatment of domesticated and captive animals in terms of the elements of cruel and
unusual punishment.
If we wish to avoid cruel and unusual punishment of nonhuman animals,
certain large-scale changes would need to occur. First, we would have to eliminate
most, if not all, of our factory farming sentient animals for food. The vast majority of
animals on such farms are clearly treated inhumanely, violating all four of the
criteria. It may be the case that more animal-centric farms which prioritize the wellbeing of their animals do not violate all elements of cruel and unusual treatment. In
particular, they may treat the animals with dignity and in socially acceptable ways.41
The other two elements would be harder to meet, and I think necessity would be the
hardest. There are places in the world where meat is currently a needed part of
people’s nutrition, either because of an inability to grow crops, lack of access to
varied foods, or other dietary, monetary, and geographical limitations. But I am only

The concept of dignity is a complex one, both legally and philosophically. It is used to
mean different things in different contexts. Not wishing to give a full reprisal of the topic, I
will point the reader to “Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law” by Neomi Rao.
41
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talking about the U.S. for the moment, and within that context, meat appears
unnecessary.42
Regarding the use of animals in research, the issue is a bit more tricky. For
one, some animals are kept in ways that are not as obviously abusive. I personally
worked in a capuchin lab where the animals were kept in an enclosure that was
approximately 12 x 12 ft. (according to my memory, not a measuring tape), with
several forms of enrichment. Of course, there is something to be said about the
space being much smaller than would be ideal as well as the inherent unnaturalness
of the situation, but certainly there are degrees of mistreatment. In general, it seems
that research dubbed “pure research” which often involves primarily observation
rather than physical experiments, is less invasive and uncomfortable for the
animals. So the question of which studies exactly violate an animal’s dignity would
have to be examined in detail in order to develop standards for animal treatment in
labs. In terms of social acceptability, that would very much depend not only on the
animal’s use, but also on the relative importance of the experiment. For example,
people tend to balk at causing animals pain for testing incidentals like cosmetics, but
are split for life-saving medical advances. (Strauss 2018) Concerning arbitrariness
and lack of necessity, some studies are certainly in violation of these principles. And
while there are laws in place intended to minimize these, the laws are insufficient.
There may be exceptions to this rule. Some feel, for example, that meat is a necessary of
some people’s diets. I don’t currently believe that to be true, but if it were, my position
would have to be revised accordingly.
There is also a point made about meat being an affordable, nutrient rich option for those
with limited funds. (Wyness 2015) While this may be true, it is largely a result of how our
government has decided to dole out subsidies. The meat industry is heavily subsidized,
making it much cheaper than it would otherwise be. If other foods were subsidized, they
would likewise become more affordable.
42
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Therefore, to align research with basic rights for sentient animals would likely lead
to a vast reduction in the numbers and ways in which they are used.
Lastly, we would have to reconsider animals as used in entertainment, which
includes TV and movies, fairs, petting zoos, circuses, zoos, and so on. Certainly some
of these realms are more often harmful than others. In recent years, largely due to
public outcry, many circuses have begun ending or phasing out their animal acts.
(Holpuch 2015; Berenson 2015) Many zoos keep animals in enclosures which are
much too small for them and lack natural elements and enrichment. Animals in fairs
are usually overworked, tired, and stressed. (Russo 2015; Sullivan n.d.) Despite the
ubiquity of mistreatment in these areas, it would be a mistake to conclude that all
animals used in entertainment are so treated. For instance, there are many zoos
which are actively expanding and improving their enclosures. There are open-range
zoos, which allow animals to roam over large areas without forced interaction with
humans. Just as with research, we would need to develop minimum standards for
how animals are kept and treated in any of these areas. There are currently
minimum standards for zoos in the AWA, but these are quite insufficient.
These are only three of the many ways in which animals are used, the ways
that probably involve the most suffering. There are many other industries that
would have to be reevaluated, however, including work animals, animal auctions,
etc.
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III. Applications to Wild Animals
When talking about “wild” animals, I simply mean non-domesticated animals.
This includes both animals who have little to no contact with humans (mountain
lions and bald eagles) and animals who live near and amongst humans (like rats and
pigeons). Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka call the former sovereign animals and
the latter liminal animals, and believe each deserves separate rules for treatment.
(2011) I largely agree with them on that score. But instead of following down that
road right now, I’ll instead say a few words about current wildlife law here in the
U.S., and make some broad gestures to indicate how my proposal regarding
domesticated animals could, in theory, be expanded to include wild animals.
In general, states make laws regarding wildlife although federal agencies and
then legislators can limit them. These intra-national concerns overlap with
international concerns: animals on federal land, transportation of wild animals
across state lines, and Indian treaty rights. Wild animals are not considered “owned”
in the same way a pet is “owned.” In fact, “the federal government has never
asserted any property interest, or any claim of title, in the wild animals.” (Favre
2003) Rather, they are thought of as resources that each state, as the trustee of this
resource, has the right to regulate.
This view of animals as resources (for food, trophies, etc.) has as its basis the
same problematic assumptions about animals as property. The animals’ interests
are not well regarded, though exceptions include the protection of threatened and
endangered species even when those undermine human interests. Most of the time,
however, animals are only protected in order to maintain a sufficient population for

125

humans to continue to use. For example, if we overfish, then there will be a scarcity
of fish for human consumption. It turns out that many of the protections we offer
wild animals are in fact motivated by self-interest.
How can we fix this? This is where I think Donaldson and Kymlicka have a lot
to offer. Their view of wild animals is that they are capable of living independently
from us and that we generally have little interaction with them. They not only
deserve negative rights such as the right not be wantonly killed, but also positive
rights such as the right to direct their own lives, that is, to be allowed sovereignty in
their territories. (Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011) Importantly, we do not have many
of the obligations toward wild animals that we do toward domesticated ones, and
the rights that wild animals would get would likely be more limited in type and
scope. For instance, a right not to be neglected makes perfect sense in the case of a
companion animal, but not in the case of a wild animal.
While the idea of wild animal sovereignty may have some naysayers,43 the
general idea is both intuitive and strong, and, happily, it is easily aligned with my
own. In the case of the domesticated animal, I suggest that the human be seen as a
caretaker. In the case of the wild animal, that would not be the case. Certainly, wild
animals do not need caretakers in the same way that domesticated ones do. In my
earlier discussion, I said that oftentimes the domesticated animals’ caretaker would
be the one suing on the animal’s behalf. But that is not always the case, particularly
when the owner is the one who has caused the damage. When a wrongdoing is
brought to the attention of the authorities, the court may appoint someone to bring
See Alasdair Cochrane (2013) and Bernard Ladwig (2015) who write in criticism of the
position.
43
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suit. So it would be with wild animals. Were their rights violated, the court could
assign someone to argue on behalf of the injured party or parties. If any damages
were to be awarded, then they would go towards making the animal(s) whole in
whatever manner the court deemed fit. So the animals themselves would still be the
plaintiffs and the recipient(s) of any award.

IV. Legally Incompetent Humans as SNP’s?
I have argued that sentient nonpersons belong not in the legal categories of
person or property, but in a category of their own where they can both get the
recognition and respect they deserve and not be erroneously categorized as
persons. But perhaps it has already occurred to you that a third category would
solve many more problems than just the animal one. In Chapter Four, I described
two other groups who are treated as neither here nor there in terms of personhood
and property: fetuses and corporations. Not wishing to address the odd question of
whether corporations are sentient, there are several groups besides fetuses which
could, I believe, rightly be called sentient nonpersons. This would include many
humans such as certain comatose individuals, infants, those with significant mental
impairment of one kind or another, and so on. These humans have often been
referred to as “marginal humans” because they do not possess the abilities that
normally developed adult humans do. But they are not inherently marginal beings,
and neither are sentient nonhuman animals. A third category would allow us to see
such individuals, not as peripheral to the category of personhood, fringe cases which
represent uncomfortable moral questions, but as belonging completely to their own
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category, as full members therein, deserving of all the associated rights and
privileges.
The points I am making here are certainly controversial. There has been a
long history of humans denigrating other humans on the basis of things like race,
sex, and disability. I am fully aware that categorizing some humans as legal patients
would raise concerns and aggravate concerns about unequal treatment of such
oppressed populations. (Crary 2018) This is one reason that I have avoided
discussion of these various legal statuses as a reflection of moral status.
Sunaura Taylor (2014) writes that we can help and care for both animals and
other humans “without paternalization and infantalization,” thereby “moving
conversations about animal and disability liberation away from limited narratives
about suffering and dependence to more radical discussions about creating
accessible, nondiscriminatory space in society in which individuals and their
communities can thrive.” This is one reason that I’ve avoided discussions of status
that Kagan entered into. I’m not interested in identifying varying levels of value that
different beings have. We cannot necessarily get rid of discussions of dependence
and its corollary, incompetence, in the legal realm, although we may like to. These
terms are deeply woven into the fabric of our legal system. However, we can frame
the discussion less in terms of a need to care for these supposedly poor, helpless
beings who can’t help themselves and more in terms of developing communities
which are capable of providing for the needs of neuro-diverse individuals, which, as
Guy Scotton (2018) points out, can be conceived of as including both human and
nonhuman animals. This is what I view the third category as enabling us to do:
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expanding the law’s ability to accommodate varieties of sentient beings. As
Donaldson and Kymlicka say, “Dependency doesn’t intrinsically involve a loss of
dignity, but the way in which we respond to dependency certainly does.” (2011, 84)
Let me then say a few words about such humans and why they could
accurately be referred to as legal patients under my proposal. I have intentionally
avoided making explicit human-animal comparisons for this reason
(notwithstanding the other difficulties inherent in such a project). Nevertheless, if
rights are to be based on morally relevant characteristics (of which I do not believe
DNA structure is one), we can explore the idea that some humans are better
described as legal patients than as legal persons as a statement of philosophical
consistency rather than as a practical suggestion.
Recall that the defining characteristics of legal patients are that they do not
qualify for personhood because they lack certain high-level cognitive abilities (selfawareness, a conception of the future, etc.) and that they are sentient (as I’ve
defined it, capable of negatively-valenced experiences). Regarding comatose people,
it needs to be said that there is a huge range in their levels of consciousness and
cognitive capacity. Some (usually those in vegetative states) have no brain activity
that could be interpreted as conscious awareness, while others appear to be able not
only to perform basic cognitive functions such as recognizing auditory and visual
stimuli, but also to comprehend speech and perhaps even provide nonverbal
responses. (Cyranoski 2012) There is still a lot of mystery surrounding the issue of
what exactly comatose patients might experience, but there is sufficient data to
demonstrate that some patients who do not have the advanced cognition required
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of philosophical personhood do, indeed, respond to pain in ways similar to those of
a healthy human. (Perri et al. 2014) Despite “inherent limitations of clinical
assessment… Neuroimaging studies support the existence of distinct cerebral
responses to noxious stimulation in brain death, vegetative state, and minimally
conscious state.” (Demertzi et al. 2009; Boly et al. 2008) So we can be relatively
confident that some comatose humans fit the parameters of legal patiency.
What about fetuses and infants? There is still a lot of mystery about precisely
which cognitive capacities are held by human at early developmental stages. In
terms of self-awareness, current research suggests that self-awareness begins
around 1 year of age, when a child begins to know her own name and refer to
herself by name. And at around 18 months, children begin to recognize their
reflections in mirrors (Holinger 2012) and that is also the age where they may start
forming a theory of mind. (Baillargeon 2010) This is also the approximate age of
significant language acquisition. Each of these claims is debatable in terms of when
exactly a particular skill develops, but the point remains the same. There is some
stage before which fetuses/infants possess the faculties of philosophical
personhood. On the other hand, there’s no question that at least some of these preperson humans can feel pain.44 Again, it is not clear at what stage fetuses begin to be
able to feel pain, but it is widely accepted that the neurons that carry pain signals
from the spinal cord to the brain are not developed until the third trimester. (Miller
2016; Derbyshire 2006) However, nociception and other apparent requirements for
pain are present as early as 3 months. Either way, on the assumption that the ability
Utah recently passed a law that requires doctors to give anesthesia to a fetus prior to
performing an abortion that occurs at 20 weeks of gestation or later. (Miller 2016)
44
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to feel pain develops before the requirements of personhood are met, we have
young humans who can be most accurately described as sentient nonpersons.
Lastly, there are humans with severe cognitive impairments (advanced
Alzheimer’s, certain kinds of brain injury, etc.) who would also fit into this category.
These humans often lack the seminal markers of personhood: self-awareness, ability
to conceive of the future, use of language, etc. (Kittay 2005) Such individuals, while
unable to take care of themselves, are still capable of experiencing pain, both
physical and emotional. In fact, some studies show that they experience higher than
average levels of depression. (CDC 2011) In the current set up, between persons and
property, of course we consider them persons. But if we had the third category, a
category which we acknowledge includes nonpersons who are nonetheless
deserving of rights, then we would have a structure in place through which we can
fairly and consistently treat these beings.
As an addendum, there is one other scenario that bears discussion. As people
are often fond of pointing out in personhood discussions, there are times during a
normally developed adult human’s life when he is not a philosophical person. These
instances might include certain stages of sleep, being under general anesthesia, and
so on. In these cases, it might still make sense to consider those humans legal
patients. The guardianship would be split between oneself, in the form of any legal
documentation one had prepared directing treatment, and whoever is legally
responsible in the normal course of medical emergencies (parent, legal guardian,
proxy, etc.). We normally don’t envision this patient/guardian role coming into play
in the normal course of, say, sleeping every night. This is probably due to the fact
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that one can easily be woken up. But if we are going to use this concept of legal
patiency, we ought to do so consistently, not treating differently those humans who
do usually meet all the requirements of philosophical personhood.

V. Case Studies
Let us look at two of the recent cases that Steven Wise is working on. As
described in Chapter Three, his approach is fairly different from mine in that he is
only concerned (at least publicly) with getting certain cognitively advanced animals
(cetaceans, apes, elephants) consideration as legal persons. His fight in this direction
has led him to bring suit on behalf of the Nonhuman Rights Project and argue that
these animals cannot be legally detained without proper cause. I will detail two of
his ongoing cases first and then describe how these cases would be approached
quite differently were it to take place under my suggested framework.
A. Belulah, Karen, and Minnie
This first case involves 3 elephants. Belulah and Minnie are Asian elephants
and Karen is an African elephant. All three are owned by the Commerford Zoo,
which is headquartered in CT. The USDA has cited the Zoo over 50 times for
violating the minimum standards required of the Animal Welfare Act. Violations to
the elephants include, “failure to have an employee or attendant present during
periods of public contact with the elephants; failure to give adequate veterinary care
to treat an excessive accumulation of necrotic skin on the elephants’ heads; failure
to maintain the elephant transport trailer; inadequate drainage in the elephant
enclosure; failure to dispose of a large accumulation of soiled hay, bedding, and
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feces behind the elephant barn; and failure to keep an elephant under the control of
a handler while she was giving rides.” (NhRP 2019) Minnie has attacked and
critically injured her handlers on several occasions, including while being ridden on.
According to the NhRP website, the case has so far progressed as follows
(I’ve listed only the relevant events here):
11/13/17: The NhRP files a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus45 in CT
to demand recognition of Beulah’s, Karen’s and Minnie’s legal personhood
and fundamental right to bodily liberty and their release to a sanctuary.
12/26/17: The Judge dismisses the petition. Wise criticizes the grounds for the
dismissal. [These grounds are discussed below.]
1/16/18: The NhRP asks the court to reverse its dismissal due to “significant errors
in the decision, including labeling the case ‘frivolous’ simply because it is
novel and… concluding that the NhRP does not meet the requirements for
third-party standing…”
6/11/18: The NhRP files a second habeas corpus petition in another CT county.
11/13/18: Four amicus briefs are filed in the Appellate Court of CT supporting the
elephants’ right (due to their personhood) to a habeas corpus hearing.
4/22/19: Wise argues in court that the lower court based its dismissal of the first
petition on serious errors of law.
TBD: It’s expected to take 6-9 months for the judges’ decision to come down.
The claim that Wise is making is essentially that because elephants are
persons, and because it is illegal to detain persons without due cause, that it is illegal
to detain these elephants without due cause. He therefore relies completely on the
claim that these animals are persons to make his case. He has to, because the writ of
habeas corpus only applies to persons. The understanding is that all and only
persons are entitled to bodily liberty and autonomy protected by habeas corpus.
(Memorandum of Decision 2017)

45

Wherein the detainment of a person must be legally justified.
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The court brings up that habeas corpus can be used in the case of children,
but only by those who have standing, who are the parents and/or legal guardian(s).
The court notes that were the elephants to be considered persons, it would be their
caretakers and not the NhRP which would have standing to bring suit. So, in the case
of children a “next friend” can bring suit. A next friend is defined as having shown
good reason that the individual cannot bring case on their own behalf, must be
dedicated to the best interests of the individual on behalf of whom they are filing,
and must have a “significant relationship” with them.
So we have at least two issues. The first is that only persons have the right
not to be unjustifiably detained. The second is that there are limits on who can bring
a case on behalf of such persons. The court used both these reasons to deny Wise’s
motion. Because of these laws, the court found that there was no probability of the
case succeeding (aka “triviality”) and it was dismissed.
This would all go quite differently were elephants to be considered, not
persons, but legal patients. In Chapter Five, I described the two sorts of rights that
legal patients would have: the right to some degree of freedom from bodily harm
and interference and the right to sue in civil court. Specifications of the first right are
beyond the scope of this writing, but one could easily imagine that confinement in
the manner described, particularly that which violates the AWA, would be
prohibited by its consideration. I would expect that most confinement would be
outlawed whose primary purpose is entertainment (as opposed to more
straightforwardly utilitarian pursuits, such as research). Either way, the second
right, the right to sue, would certainly be relevant here.
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Were Belulah, Karen, and Minnie to be able to sue, then the issues of triviality
and standing would not have arisen. Because sentient nonpersons would have the
right to freedom from unjustified bodily liberty, whether or not a zoo was
considered justified, the case would be heard. The judge could not dismiss the case
because there would be an actual liberty right that the elephants had, and therefore
they would also have the right to sue if they (or their spokesperson) believed that
right to be violated. Likewise, the issue of standing, or “next friend”, would not arise.
Just as with human children, were the legal guardians to be the ones accused of
violating the subject’s rights, the court would be enabled to appoint a guardian ad
litem (GAL) to bring case on the subject’s behalf. It would probably not be Steven
Wise (although I can’t say precisely how the lawyer would be chosen), but some
lawyer would be assigned to argue the case. Whether or not the animal would win
the case would depend on a host of things that are, as yet, undetermined. But the
case would be heard.
B. Tommy
Tommy is also a male chimpanzee who was kept alone in a cage in a shed. He
was an animal actor who was in the 1987 film Project X during which he was likely
beaten with blackjacks and clubs. He is now kept in the concrete cage with a TV for
company. Here are some of the highlights of Tommy’s case’s progression from the
NhRP’s website. This one is a little longer because I’ve included some interesting
quotes from the cases that indicate the motivations of the judges in reaching their
decisions.
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12/2/13: The NhRP files a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in New
York State Supreme Court to demand recognition of Tommy’s legal
personhood and right to bodily liberty and his transfer to a sanctuary.
12/3/13: The writ is denied, but the judge says, “You make a very strong argument.
However, I do not agree … Article 70 applies to chimpanzees,” because they
are not persons.
12/4/14: The Third Judicial Department rules that Tommy “is not a ‘person’”
primarily because “…unlike human beings, chimpanzees can’t bear any legal
duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for
their actions.”
12/4/15: The NhRP files a new habeas petition on Tommy’s behalf.
3/16/17: Wise argues the capacity to bear duties and responsibilities isn’t a legally
acceptable reason for denying Tommy personhood. Requiring this “[would
deprive] millions of humans in New York the ability to go into court.”
2/26/18: The NhRP filed a motion for permission to appeal, including an amicus
curiae brief. The brief maintains that the First Department’s ruling “uses a
number of incompatible conceptions of person which, when properly
understood, are either philosophically inadequate or in fact compatible with
…Tommy’s personhood.”
5/8/18: The motion is denied, but one of the concurring judges, Judge Eugene M.
Fahey, states “To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to liberty
protected by habeas corpus is to regard the chimpanzee as entirely lacking
independent worth, as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of
which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has
the right to be treated with respect… The issue whether a nonhuman animal
has a fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is
profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our relationship with all the life
around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it. While it may be
arguable that a chimpanzee is not a ‘person,’ there is no doubt that it is not
merely a thing.”
The first thing that comes up is the issue of Tommy’s personhood. Although
Tommy is a chimpanzee and not an elephant, the concerns with this are largely the
same as with the previous case regarding Belulah, Karen, and Minnie, so I won’t
revisit those points. The second section of interest is when court states that Tommy
“is not a ‘person’” because “…unlike human beings, chimpanzees can’t bear any legal
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duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for their
actions.” In other words, the court is making the claim that one can only have rights
if one also is capable of having responsibilities. This is one strand of thinking within
legal discourse (the other being that rights and responsibilities can be separated),
and a potentially problematic one. As we’ve seen, and as Wise eventually pointed
out, many humans are not, and will never, be beholden to the same responsibilities
of the average adult human. Lastly, we see Judge Fahey’s discomfort (as we’ve seen
other judges’ discomfort in Chapter Four) with considering animals as mere
property.
Were there to be a third legal category as I am suggesting, persons would not
be the only category of being with rights. So the arguments over whether Tommy is
a person or not would not need to take place to begin with. As in the previous case,
Tommy, a legal patient, would have liberty rights that were being violated, and
therefore the writ of habeas corpus would not have been so easily dismissed.
Likewise, the question of whether Tommy is capable of responsibilities would be
irrelevant. Legal patients may describe exactly those beings who have rights, but
who have few or no corresponding legal duties. Finally, Judge Fahey’s concern
would be alleviated because Tommy would not be “merely a thing” anymore.
These cases may help to illuminate the real need for legal reform that steps
outside the current person/property dichotomy. If we remain stuck within these
categories, sentient animals remain stuck as well. They don’t belong, at least in the
eyes of many, in either group, but remain trapped in the realm of property because
of our unwillingness to grant them personhood.
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VI. Conclusion
When we look at the U. S. legal system, we can clearly see that the law is
trailing behind shifting public opinion and the growing knowledge we have of
animal minds. The law still treats animals, in most cases, as no more than inanimate
objects to be protected in order to secure the property owner’s rights. This is
severely misguided. On the other hand, we can also see that the many attempts of
getting nonhuman animals recognized as legal persons have failed, and, in fact, do
not appear close to succeeding. So what can be done?
I have argued that we need a way of granting all sentient animals rights. This
is the primary goal of the whole project: to present a realistic and sensible solution
to the problem. While it may be that certain cognitively advanced animals will be
granted personhood someday, we cannot wait for that to happen, nor would such an
occurrence accommodate all sentient beings. I proposed creating a third, new
category, patiency, to legally house beings who are neither person nor property.
Such a move would, I believe, address both the legal and philosophical
concerns with current animal treatment. By creating a new designation, we would
be enabled to give a class of beings civil rights who are not legal persons. Were all
animals to remain as property, that would not be plausible. Furthermore, we would
be able to sidestep the decades old welfare-rights debate, and fill in holes from other
philosophical and political paradigms which have been suggested.
In this chapter, I presented both some potential concerns and some potential
implications of my view which may give people pause. I am not pretending to have
each detail worked out. Much of the nitty-gritty will not be resolved by a
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philosopher in her armchair, but by legislators, lawyers, and government agencies.
There is also more theoretical work to be incorporated, such as a discussion of when
exactly a legal person’s rights may override a legal patient’s rights. This issue may
come to bear particularly in certain industries, such as the use of animals in
scientific research.
There are also questions about possible expansions of this paradigm to
include sentient nonpersons other than nonhuman animals. It is conceivable that
someday other sentient nonpersons would be considered legal patients, such as
fetuses and other humans with particular kinds of cognitive impairments. Whether
this is advisable is an entirely different question. Likewise, I have limited the
discussion to domestic animals, though in theory we could include wild animals as
well. Doing so would certainly present some practical difficulties, but is nonetheless
a worthy topic for discussion and exploration.
I hope that the framework laid out above provides an adequate outline of a
way out of the current legal quagmire we find ourselves in regarding animals. The
legal system was not created with them in mind. It doesn’t have to stay that way,
however. With an increasing awareness of who and what animals are, we cannot in
good conscience delay meaningful legal reform any longer. It is time for the law to
catch up.
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